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Abstract 
 
Since the late 1990s, network airlines worldwide have being enrolling in one of the three current 
Global Airline Alliances (GALs), oneworld, Star Alliance and SkyTeam. By 2011, airlines belonging 
to the three GALs transported over two-thirds of all international traffic. This thesis studies the 
reasons that cause an increasing number of airlines to join this collaborative scheme as a way to 
develop a wider network and to increase profitability by serving international connecting traffic.  
The evolution of GALs is characterized here by the analysis of the size of these alliances, as well as 
by the volume of partnerships and code share agreements between alliance partners during the 
period 2006-2011. The results of this study illustrate the differences between each of the GALs and 
the degree of dependence of airlines on alliances to develop their international networks. By most 
indicators, the largest alliance, Star Alliance, is the GAL in which member airlines rely more on their 
alliance partners when developing code share agreements with foreign airlines. In all three GALs, 
code share agreements between alliance partners are much less likely to be broken than with non-
partner airlines. Airlines operating in the transatlantic markets appear to be the most advanced 
firms in the marketing of code shared itineraries. 
The empirical analysis is complemented with a review of the theoretical benefits of GALs to airlines, 
alternative network models for international growth, the impact of alliances on customers’ welfare, 
their potential anti-competitive effects on independent carriers, and the current regulatory 
framework affecting alliances on both sides of the North Atlantic. Overall, this work provides a 
holistic view of the GALs as a model for network development, to describe their policy implications, 
and to suggest key drivers in the future of airlines’ network development strategies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 The Airline Industry 
 
Air transport is a major industry in the world economy on its own, with air travel revenues usually 
accounting for about 1 percent of national GDP. Furthermore, since the 1980s global air traffic has 
experienced an average annual growth rate over 5%, outpacing economic growth, and according to 
the forecasts of the two largest aircraft manufacturers, Airbus and Boeing, this trend will continue 
in the next twenty years. In addition, air transport has a widely acknowledged impact on the 
development of world trade and tourism; and, from a wider perspective, the fast and safe airborne 
transport of people and goods to any place in the world facilitates economic, political, and social 
change. Looking towards the future, air transport is of high interest for policy-makers as conditio 
sine qua non for global economic development, and it plays, as well, a major role in the 21st century 
global challenge of curbing carbon emissions.  
The main operators of passenger air transport, the commercial airlines, comprise a challenging 
industry characterized both in the US and the rest of the world by low profits and high volatility in 
returns. A distinctive element in the airline business is that most of the largest carriers in the world 
are enrolled in one of the three existing international strategic alliances—oneworld, Star Alliance, 
and SkyTeam—which are often recalled as the global airline alliances. These networks of airlines 
provide their members with a rich international route portfolio at a marginal cost that would be 
difficult to be reached through organic growth. 
Still, the provision of cross-border air services is very constrained by international regulation. Since 
the Chicago Convention of 1944 established the rules of airspace, international air transport 
markets have been governed by bilateral air service agreements (ASAs) between national 
governments. This implies that the country of registration of an airline and the bilateral agreements 
of that country with other countries has determined the airline’s possible routes of service and the 
conditions of capacity and frequency offered. Collaborative schemes between airlines, like the 
global airline alliances, are hence constructions of airlines to overcome these and other barriers 
encountered by airlines in their network expansion plans. 
The two largest airline transport markets in the world, United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU), accounting for 60% of the world traffic, each have a liberalized domestic market. The United 
States was first in deregulating its domestic airline markets in 1978, which provided carriers 
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freedom to enter and exit routes and to price them as they pleased, subject only to the US 
competition law.1 The success of this process led many other countries to liberalize their domestic 
markets, including the liberalization of cabotage services by European airlines in the EU in 1997, i.e. 
the authorization to any airline from an EU member country to transport domestic traffic within in 
any of the other EU countries. Since March 2008, these two economic regions have applied a new 
and evolving regulatory framework that removes most of the market access barriers between the 
EU and the US to create a single Open Aviation Area. 
As air transport services have been liberalized new competitors have entered the market. In most 
cases, the incoming carriers have adopted the low-cost, low-frills business model, contrasting with 
the full-service of incumbent traditional carriers. Low-cost carriers are usually characterized by 
higher labor productivity and lower operating costs that translates into lower fares than traditional 
carriers. The latter, categorized here as network legacy carriers, have focused on providing wider 
network coverage through a hub-and-spoke network model that meets consumer demands of 
seamless connections with domestic and international destinations. As a tool for developing this 
business model, global airline alliances play a pivotal role. 
 
1.2 Strategic Alliances 
 
Strategic alliances are not a unique phenomenon of airlines, as they are evident in many other 
manufacturing and service industries. In fact, every year there are about 2,000 new strategic 
alliances in the world, and partnerships in the form of alliances have been increasing at 15 percent 
annually (Cools & Roos, 2005). Relevant examples can be found in the high-tech field, e.g. Sony and 
Ericsson joined efforts in their mobile phone divisions to take on more advanced competitors; in 
the pharmaceutical business, with the alliances between biotech research centers and 
manufacturing pharmaceutical companies; or in the energy business, with the example of Chevron 
and Texaco allying in the Middle East generating billions of revenues for both companies 
(Steinhilber, 2008). Also in the air transportation business there is a current trend of alliances 
between airport companies, as reported by Forsyth et al. (2011). In the air cargo business there are 
the global strategic alliances SkyTeam Cargo and WOW Alliance, whose constituents are the cargo 
                                                             
1 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705. 
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divisions of some SkyTeam and Star Alliance members, respectively, despite holding an 
independent structure.  
Amid that, the success of alliances in industry is not guaranteed. Indeed, according to a survey of 
the US-based Association of Strategic Alliance Professionals (ASAP), the success rate of alliances is 
perceived by insiders to be about 50 percent, and as a measure of excellence in alliances, only 9 
percent of companies believe that they have success in 80 percent or more of their alliances (ASAP, 
2007). This motivates us to study if alliances are successful in the airline industry as a strategy to 
develop airline’s international network.  
In the airline industry, carriers enter into cooperative arrangements to generate greater revenue, to 
reduce unit costs from economies of size, and to minimize or share risks by strengthening their 
position out of their domestic market. In a first approach, cooperation can be characterized as 
taking the form of either tactical or strategic alliances.  
Tactical alliances, also called marketing or commercial alliances, have usually consisted of 
bilateral agreements between airlines, which by joining efforts in a limited number of routes gain 
access to the other airline’s network. This type of alliances first began with airlines cooperating at 
the marketing level through interline/pro-rating agreements and code sharing, and then the more 
coordinated joint ventures (JVs), described here: 
Interline consists of the transfer of passengers and cargo from one airline to another on 
the passenger’s route, and while each airline maintains its own identity and there is a very 
limited coordination between airlines, the passenger is charged a single fare for the route 
and the airlines share the revenues by pro-rating. 
Code sharing is the sharing of capacity between carriers on a given flight that has a code 
for each of the airlines involved in the agreement, earning consumer recognition that the 
flight corresponds to the carrier to whom the itinerary was purchased.2 This is the most 
widely used form of alliance in the airline industry. There are two mechanisms for placing 
interline passengers on each other’s flights: airline A can sell an itinerary involving airlines 
A and B and pay airline B for accepting the passenger on one or more of the flight legs; or 
airline A can have some seats reserved in airline B to sell at the price it sees fit, the so-
called “blocked space arrangement”. 
                                                             
2 Airline designation codes are two letters assigned by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). 
They are listed for use in reservations, timetables, tickets, as well as in airline industry applications. 
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Joint ventures (JVs) are revenue-sharing or profit-sharing partnerships between carriers 
on international routes, so that a partner’s revenue or profit generated from a passenger 
does not depend on which airline provided the service. In fact, JVs can be recalled as 
“metal neutral” alliances, as each airline gets its revenue portion regardless of who 
operates the actual aircraft in a route-to-route basis.3 The full implementation of this 
cooperative strategy on a given route requires the granting of antitrust immunity by the 
regulatory bodies to allow partner alliances to set schedules and prices together.4  
 
Strategic alliances are bilateral or multilateral agreements in which the allied airlines share 
similar business objectives and they coordinate their services to achieve their common goals.5 
Doganis (2006) focuses on the use of a common brand, a uniform service standard, and the asset 
comingling of aircraft, staff, traffic rights, terminal facilities or capital resources to identify the 
airlines that are in a strategic alliance. Tretheway (1990), Oum & Park (1997) and Fan et al. (2001) 
mentioned exclusive membership and joint marketing entity as the ‘definitive characteristics of 
strategic alliances’. In addition, coordinated reservations, sales and inventory management, 
frequent flyer reciprocity, and a special emphasis in providing seamless connections are key 
elements of current strategic alliances. 
 
As of today, there are three competing strategic international alliances in the industry: Star 
Alliance, oneworld, and SkyTeam, recalled as the global airline alliances (GALs), launched 
between 1997 and 2001 and, currently, each of them having a dozen or more airline members. In 
each multilateral alliance, participants decide with which airlines they establish code share 
agreements, and which routes they include in the agreement. Although alliance members cooperate 
on many aspects, they may nonetheless remain competitors. Nevertheless, within the alliances 
there are also subgroups of airlines granted with antitrust immunity. 
                                                             
3 As indicated by Bilotkatch & Hüschelrath (2011) the term “joint venture” although is being comonly used in 
the literature and the business community as a revenue sharing and joint price setting arrangement, should 
be more generically referred to any kind of cooperation between airlines trying to overcome the limitations 
of unassociative interlining. In this work, however, this concept is used with the traditional narrower 
meaning defined above.  
4 The term “antitrust immunity” refers to the US antitrust laws, although it is also commonly applied in the 
literature to the European context. 
5 The term “strategic alliances” was initially preferred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as a replication of 
the terminology used for sustainable alliances between organizations in other industries. Later, due to the 
geographic coverage of the airline alliances, the term global alliance was coined. Today the latter is more used 
in the airline industry, as it is more explanatory of the scope of the agreement between network legacy 
carriers.  
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Figure 1.2.1 shows the differences between the different forms of cooperation between airlines and 
how the cooperation level has increased with time, according to Iatrou & Oretti (2007). Within a 
global airline alliance, however, the reality is more complex, as there are different levels of 
cooperation. In fact, in each of the three alliances there is a subgroup of European and US airlines 
with granted antitrust immunity to coordinate pricing and scheduling in the transatlantic market 
and, within each of these three sub-groups, a core of two or three carriers has either a revenue or a 
profit sharing joint venture. Figure 1.2.2 illustrates the three layers of cooperation within a global 
airline alliance, from the baseline relationship that includes all global alliance partners, to the 
granting of antitrust immunity by the US Department of Transportation in the North Atlantic 
intercontinental flows for a subgroup of aligned airlines of the same GAL, and the integrated joint 
venture (JV) in the North Atlantic markets for a more reduced number of airlines.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1.2.1. Expected development of partnerships (Iatrou & Oretti, 2007). 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 By 2010 each of the three GALs had a core of two of three members in the global airline alliance in a North 
Atlantic joint venture: Star Alliance members Air Canada, Lufthansa and United-Continental; oneworld 
members American Airlines and IAG (British Airways and Iberia); and SkyTeam members Air France-KLM, 
Alitalia, and Delta Airlines. 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s? 
Interline 
Code share 
Antitrust immunity 
Global Alliances 
Cross-border mergers Level of 
coordination 
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Figure 1.2.2. Different levels of cooperation within a Global Airline Alliance.  
 
 
1.3 Motivation and Goals of this Thesis 
 
The undertaking of this research is motivated by the importance of the three global airline 
alliances—oneworld, Star Alliance, and SkyTeam—for the network expansion of most of the largest 
firms in the highly competitive and beleaguered airline industry, making this strategic construction 
of the greatest significance for policy-makers. At the same time, the prevalence of this collaborative 
framework between airlines requires understanding that the driving forces of globalization, 
domestic competition, barriers to entry in foreign markets, and incentives for creation of 
shareholder value, among others, make global alliances a core tool of airlines in their expansion 
efforts.  
This author identifies in the topic of global airline alliances a case study located at the interface 
between transport economics, public policy, and corporate strategy. Hence, it is the definitive 
motivation of this work to analyze the three Global Airline Alliances from this holistic perspective. 
Furthermore, given that strategic alliances are not unique to the airline industry but have proved to 
be successful in other manufacturing and service industries, this work should be of interest for 
scholars in other fields. In fact, network activities in communications, transportation, or utilities 
may only be conceivable through the hub-and-spoke network structure that member airlines have 
implemented. Similarities in economic and managerial fundamentals and the exposure of firms to 
similar driving forces might enlarge the potential audience and interest of this work.  
JOINT
VENTURE
GAL partners 
sharing revenues 
and/or costs under ATI
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY (ATI)
IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
Global alliance partners with freedom to coordinate 
prices and scheduling
GLOBAL ALLIANCE PARTNERS
Code sharing, Frequent Flyer Programs, lounge access, etc.—same rights 
within the global airline alliance
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As is shown next in Section 1.4, there is an extensive literature on strategic alliances from a myriad 
of perspectives. We have identified, however a lack of empirical data on the impact of Star Alliance, 
oneworld, and SkyTeam on the performance of their members. For the present work, the proxy for 
“performance” is the key issue of development of an international network, quantified here in terms 
of code sharing routes and number of code share agreements. 
Overall, the goal of this thesis is to provide an explanatory framework that identifies the reasons for 
the continuous growth of the three Global Airline Alliances a decade after the last of them was 
launched. Some conclusions about these collaborative structures can be provided from the 
empirical study of the relationship between the global alliance of enrollment and the patterns of 
code share agreements of its members for marketing a wider international network.  
 
1.4 Literature Review 
 
Domestic and international airline alliances were one of the most critical advents in the airline 
industry in the 1990s. By then, a rich and evolving literature had developed to understand the 
implications of alliances on airline management and end consumers. Considerable research work 
was on the scope of alliances, strategy alternatives of airlines within this new framework, and the 
economic impacts of alliances. With the change of millennium, as the three Global Airline Alliances 
(GALs) became predominant, one can observe more focus on empirical analyses of GALs’ impact on 
prices and competition, revenue and marketing innovations, and airline operations. This section 
examines the most relevant works in several of the directions taken by the literature on airline 
alliances. 
By the end of the 1990s, the work of Fernandez de la Torre (1999) provided a coherent overview of 
the different typologies of collaborative models between airlines, listed positive and negative 
impacts of alliances to airlines, and analyzed the effect of the level of network connectivity on 
capturing traffic and market share for the first North-Atlantic strategic alliance at that time, 
between Northwest Airlines and KLM. 
Morrish & Hamilton (2002) contributed with a rich, though concentrated, review of the findings of 
major studies on global airline alliances during the period 1986-2000. The authors discussed both 
the conceptual and empirical evidence in the literature to conclude that although global airline 
alliances helped to increase airlines’ load factors and productivity, a positive impact on profitability 
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and members’ competitive position could not be claimed, and they cited increased flight frequency 
and decreasing airfares as counter-balancing forces for this null effect.  
To the extent of my knowledge, Iatrou and Oretti (2007) provide the most comprehensive text on 
the opportunities and challenges for airlines with regards to alliances and mergers. Their work 
includes a questionnaire submitted to carriers’ executives in more than 30 airlines, becoming one 
of the very few insights available the literature about the impact of alliances on member airlines. 
The survey reveals that code share is considered to be the most productive type of cooperation for 
increasing traffic, followed by frequent-flyer programs, and antitrust immunity, while strategic 
alliances without antitrust immunity were reported to have a more limited impact on traffic. 
Respondents also declared that the largest impact of alliances was on traffic increase, as reported 
previously by Youseff & Hansen (2004) and Oum et al. (2000), and the lowest impact was on fare 
increase and cost reduction. Similarly, a previous holistic study of the alliances’ system, by 
Kleymann & Seristö (2004) also held interviews with airline managers, discussed the benefits that 
alliance partners can extract, and addressed the question of how strategic alliances affect 
performance.  
It is in the work of Oum et al. (2000) where one of the most rigorous empirical analysis of the 
impact of alliances on airlines’ performance can be found. Oum et al. worked with a cross panel data 
base of 22 international carriers during the period 1986-1995. They estimated that profitability 
increased by 1.5% for strategic alliances, while prices of flights in airline alliances were lowered 
and productivity rose. They also found that strategic alliances increased traffic volume between 
intercontinental gateways significantly over routes in non-alliance gateways. In fact, to the extent of 
my knowledge the work of Oum et al. (2000) is a unique case in the literature in the quantification 
of the impact of alliances on airlines’ performance. 
Among strategic analyses of alliances, a work to be highlighted is the early framework on the 
economic forces affecting the airline industry by Fan et al. (2001) which includes a correct 
prediction of the current scenario in the airline industry with a few global strategic alliances, as 
well as the persistence of driving forces towards intercontinental mega-carriers. Agusdinata & de 
Klein (2002) also explained the dynamic of airline alliances. Using a system dynamics’ approach 
they described the endogenous and exogenous driving forces behind the formation of alliances and 
they addressed the concepts of optimum GAL size and the trade-off between collaborative learning 
and airline independence. 
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A unique perspective on airline alliances is the analysis of press, public relations, annual reports 
and interviews to airlines’ directors and staff made by Vaara et al. (2004) for European carriers. 
The authors analyzed the strategic talks on airline alliances in the period 1995-2004 in order to 
understand the processes and practices in the discourse that contribute to create a strategy. They 
observed that some themes like “corporatization”, “globalization”, “financialization”, “market 
power”, “economies of scale”, or “risk-sharing”, legitimized the way for alliances as a “solution” to 
the “problems” associated with the previous “old-fashioned’ thinking. Interestingly, the concept of 
“independence”, which was linked with a nationalistic discourse, was found to be ambiguously used 
both by antagonist and protagonists of alliances. According to airlines’ staff, dysfunctionalities 
within the alliance seemed to be solvable by establishing “control”, “authority”, or “decision-making 
power” at the alliance top-management level.  
As a provider of reliable data on code share agreements formation, every year, and during more 
than two decades, the monthly magazine Airline Business has provided a list of the collaborative 
agreements in place between GAL members through an annual survey filled by the airlines’ 
management teams. As part of the empirical analysis, Airline Business’ 2006-2011 data base to is 
used to analyze the trends on code share agreements among GALs’ members.  
Considering airline operations within an alliance, Tiernan et al. (2008) studied the differences in 
service quality in terms of reported flight cancellations and missing baggage by aggregating 
consumer reports’ data in the US and Europe for the airlines in each of the three GALS finding no 
statistically significant differences between the three GALs. Höltbrügge et al. (2006) analyzed 
human resource management in a GAL (Star Alliance) to conclude that pressures for differentiation 
were larger than driving forces towards a common strategy within Star Alliance, resulting in limited 
standardization in training and development, and always under the responsibility of the individual 
airlines. Gudmundsson et al. (2002) presented the challenges and opportunities in the merging of 
frequent-flyer-programs (FFP) between partners and how this related to GALs’ stability. 
An operative factor of great importance for airlines is alliance revenue management, i.e. how shared 
seat inventory on each airline’s code share flights can be optimized to maximize revenue gains. 
Boyd (1988) compared the advantages of centralized and decentralized revenue management 
systems for alliances, pointing out that the former system requires extreme coordination and 
information exchange between partners, which is not possible due to operational, organization and 
regulatory constraints, while it allows reaching a global optimum. Fernandez de la Torre (1999) 
and Darot (2001) introduced various mechanisms of revenue sharing and they also considered how 
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code share impacts the redistribution of local and connecting traffic on an airline network. Vinod 
(2005) and Jain (2011) suggested dynamic approaches to further optimize revenue gains. 
Specifically, the work of Jain (2011) addresses the implementation of the dynamic valuation 
scheme for code share paths in real revenue management systems. 
Considering alliance election, a few theoretical studies are highlighted. On the one hand, Flores-
Fillol & Moner-Colonques (2007) took a game-theoretic approach to theorize the strategies 
involved in the formation of bilateral partnerships between airlines under the existence of 
complementary interline trips. Their framework considered product differentiation and economies 
of traffic density. The authors identified scenarios of unprofitable alliance formation and they 
concluded that alliances could not take place in conditions of close substitution. From a different 
approach, examples of decision-making models for the election of a convenient alliance considering 
different stakeholders, i.e. corporation departments, and their multiple criteria within an airline can 
be found in the works of Liou et al. (2011) and Liou (2012).  
Moving to the public policy perspective, the effects of interlining, code share, international alliances 
and alliance antitrust immunity in airfares have been extensively investigated in the economic 
literature from the mid-1990s. There has been a special emphasis in the US domestic market and 
the international routes with origin or destination in the US, due to the availability of the Passenger 
Origin-Destination database of the US Department of Transportation including a 10 percent 
quarterly sample of all airline tickets sold by US carriers. The works of Jan Brueckner and Tom 
Whalen, and Tae Oum, Jong-Hun Park and Aming Zhang, and, more recently, Vladimir Bilotkach, 
have been the most salient in the modeling and empirical analysis of the price effects on markets 
operated by allied airlines. Looking at international alliances, Park and Zhang (2000), Brueckner 
and Whalen (2000), Brueckner (2003a), Whalen (2007), and Bilotkach (2007) have provided 
empirical evidence that, since the 1990s, alliance fares for connecting travel itineraries through 
alliances have been lower than interline fares. In Section 5.2 we extend this discussion to the latest 
findings, including the observation of the impacts of allied airlines operating under antitrust 
immunity. 
With regard the perceptions of consumers an interesting work is the analysis by Goh & Uncles 
(2003) of the perceived benefits of global airline alliances by Australian business passengers. Their 
results showed limited differentiation of the benefits provided by different alliances. Additionally, 
the authors found that consumers did not discriminate airlines based on their alliance, and that the 
preferred local airline (Qantas) is what determined the preferred global alliance (oneworld). 
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From a public policy perspective, at the time of this thesis the most recent views of policy-makers in 
the US and the European Union (EU) with regard to airline alliances in the EU-US Transatlantic 
market were represented in a comprehensive joint report by its regulatory bodies in November 
2010 (European Commission and U.S. Deparment of Transportation, 2010). Another relevant 
opinion in the process was aported by Kahn (2004), in which the “architect” of the 1978 airline 
deregulation in the US very briefly discussed the convenience of alliances for public benefit. Kahn’s 
conclusion was that alliances were beneficial to enhance the economies of scope of hub-and-spoke 
carriers, as these efficiencies were in the interest of the public. However, Kahn also raised the 
problems of suppressed competition. Other works by Gillespie & Richard (2011), Brueckner & 
Proost (2009), and Bilotkach & Hüschelrath (2011) have discussed in detail the (in)convenience of 
granting antitrust immunity to allied airlines in the transatlantic market as well as the alternatives 
available to balance efficiency gains and the preservation of a competitive industry. 
 
1.5 Thesis Overview 
 
This first chapter has presented a brief overview of the current state of the industry, the basic 
concepts on alliances, motivation of the thesis and its goal, and a brief overview of the existing 
literature on airline alliances. The second chapter provides an explanatory framework of the 
particularities of the industry that bring airlines to join alliances for developing an international 
network. It also considers other internalization strategies in the industry. A special emphasis is 
given to the different potential benefits that strategic alliances in the airline industry can procure to 
its members.  
The third chapter focuses in the empirical analysis of the Global Airline Alliances (GALs). It presents 
the evolution of GALs during the period 2006-2011 considering the use made of alliances by their 
members in their development of code share agreements. In addition, two regression models are 
shown providing evidence of the relation between geographic situation and GAL of enrollment with 
the number of code share agreements and code sharing routes of airlines in 2011. 
Chapter 4 discusses the reported effects of collaborative agreements between airlines on 
consumers’ welfare and competition. The current competition regulation in the European Union 
and the United States for collaborative airlines is contrasted, and some of the potential implications 
of a more integrated market between both regions are discussed.  
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Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this thesis, draws conclusions from them and 
proposes future research directions. 
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Chapter 2: International growth of airlines 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The appearance and progress of global alliances as a strategy for developing airline networks and 
increasing revenue sources can be explained by both exogenous and endogenous drivers to the 
airline industry. Together, they have shaped a business in which an increasing number of airline 
carriers all over the globe are joining one of the three Global Airline Alliances (GALs). This chapter 
provides an overview of the challenging constraints encountered by airlines in foreign countries, 
the motivations and strategies that the industry has followed to adapt to these challenges, and the 
potential business benefits that airlines pursue when joining strategic alliances.  
On the one hand, airlines face barriers when intending to provide international services to their 
customers. The general perception is that the air transportation is a highly nationally regulated 
sector that constrains carriers when serving customers in markets outside of their national 
borders. Although this holds true, regulatory barriers are just one of the barriers encountered by 
airlines. The importance of trade costs as a barrier of entry is acknowledged in the economic 
literature as costs driven by policy, geographical, and environmental reasons can dominate 
production costs in some cases up to factors of even ten or more (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2004). 
Section 2.2 presents the particulars of these barriers in the airline sector and how this compares to 
other industries. 
On the other hand, airlines have found enough economic incentives to pursue international 
operations. Section 2.3 overviews some of the theoretical motivations of this expansion. As a 
continuation, Section 2.3.1 to Section 2.3.3 present the different strategies that low-cost carriers, 
legacy network carriers, and a particular group of firms in the Persian Gulf, have been following in 
their international network development. Finally, a review of the potential benefits of multilateral 
strategic alliances is presented in Section 2.4.  
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2.2 Particularities of the international air transport services  
 
Airlines, when providing international services to their customers, are exposed to some of the 
peculiarities of service sectors that make of the airline business one with notable barriers to entry. 
In a first macroeconomic overview, it is remarkable that while services contribute in more than two 
thirds to the overall production in most of the developed countries, the international trade in 
services is just one quarter of the contribution of good exports to the GDP (World Bank, 2011). This 
manifests that international trade in services has, in general, a modest weight in the national 
production of countries in comparison with the high, and increasing, importance of the service 
sector in the overall economy. In fact, it is documented that barriers to international service in both 
high-income and developing countries are higher than those for trade in goods (Borchert et al., 
2010). 
The imbalance between economic production and trade can be largely explained by the evidences 
that the trade costs in international services double or triple the cost of trading with goods.7 Even in 
the well-known close trade relationship between the USA and Canada, trade costs in goods are 30% 
in ad valorem equivalent terms, while around 100% in services. On a world aggregate basis, the 
tendency is that while trade costs in goods decreased in 15% during the 1995-2007 period, the 
trade costs in services have been flat. The only exception is China, where trade costs have 
decreased significantly in both goods and services, which can be explained by their initial higher 
service costs. It is also worth mentioning that as some European countries shown a constant decline 
in trade costs for goods after their accession to the EU, trade costs in services remain stagnant after 
an initial fall of less than 20% (Mirodout et al., 2010). 
Among all these internationally traded services, the airline industry stands out as an exceptional 
case due to its high entry barriers to foreign investors. These barriers are not only limited to 
regulatory measures, but other service trade costs in culture, geography and institutions might also 
play a major role, even in more integrated economies like the European Union. Somewhat related to 
trade costs, new entrants would operate under the absence of economies of density and scope that 
airlines usually exploit in their domestic networks, and they might experience limited access to 
airport’s slots in foreign countries due to the grandfather rights of incumbent airlines. In fact, these 
                                                             
7 Here we define trade costs as all the costs incurred in getting a good or service to a final user other than the 
marginal cost of producing the good itself, in accordance with Anderson & van Wincoop (2004). 
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elements become primary natural barriers for airlines pursuing to enter a new geographical market 
due to the inability to replicate their domestic business model.  
Looking forward, Mirodout et al. stated that some industries are comparatively less exposed to 
future falls in trade costs because of the need of dealing directly with the consumer. This is the case 
of air transport services as airlines require of physical infrastructures like airports to deliver their 
services. This limits to some degree the new possibilities of working overseas that the information 
and communication technologies are enhancing.  
As a matter of fact, however, one of the most differentiating features of air transport when 
compared to other industries is the constraints that national regulations impose on foreign airline 
carriers. Although there has been a continuous process of bilateral and multilateral agreements on 
open skies8, the airline sector continues to be a paradigm of restrictiveness to international 
entering airlines. The existing limitations to foreign investment in airlines are especially 
remarkable. A measurable evidence of the regulatory restrictions is the limit to foreign ownership 
and control, shown in Table 2.2.1. 
 
Table 2.2.1. Limits on foreign ownership of airlines for selected countries. 
Country Limits on foreign ownership 
Australia 49% for airlines engaged in international operations;  
100% for solely domestic airlines 
Canada 32% 
China 35% 
Chile 100% as long as airline’s principal place of business is in Chile 
European Union 49%, applies to non-EU citizens 
India 49%, but foreign airlines cannot hold shares in Indian airlines 
Japan 33.33% 
Korea 49% 
Malaysia 45% 
New Zealand 49% for airlines engaged in international operations;  
100% for solely domestic airlines 
Singapore 27.51% 
Taiwan 33.33% 
Thailand 30% 
United States 25%; one-third of the board of directors; chairman/woman must be US 
national 
Printed from Odoni (2009). 
 
                                                             
8 Gunther (1999) estimated that nearly 70% of the 400 air service agreements initiated since the GATS were 
either open skies agreements or allowed other similar liberalizing measures.  
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As argued by Odoni (2009), this special attitude towards airlines can be caused by the government 
concerns on the use of air infrastructure in cases of national emergency or military needs, as well as 
the national pride of “flag carriers”, or even the fear of losing well-remunerated jobs. In a broad 
framework, however, the welfare gains from the liberalization of services are widely acknowledged 
and many countries show an interest in liberalizing trade in services. This helped to launch 
negotiations on trade in services in the Uruguay Round9, as well as the creation of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 1994 (Francois & 
Hoekman, 2010).  
The reality for air transport service, however, is that it was excluded from the Uruguay Round, as 
members preferred to continue with the regime of bilateral reciprocity incepted at the Chicago 
Convention (1944), instead of the GATS. The early beginnings of the Doha Round10, initiated in 
2001, were no exception, and the only application of the GATS to the airline industry was in the 
following ancillary services: catering services, aircraft repair and maintenance, sales and marketing, 
and computer reservation services.  
The system of international traffic rights known as Freedoms of the Air, established by the Chicago 
Convention, provides an alternative framework to the GATS. By all means, the former substitutes 
the latter in international trade of air transportation services. Here we provide an analogy between 
the modes of supply covered by the GATS, and their equivalent Freedoms of Air, which define the 
extent of bilateral and multilateral air service agreements (ASAs) between countries.11 Table 2.2.2 
indicates the different modes covered by the GATS.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations involved 122 countries from 1986 to 1994 trying to 
reduce restrictions in the trade of services and goods. The Final Act covers all the negotiating areas cited in 
the first declaration, held in Uruguay, and brought “the biggest reform of the world’s trading system since 
GATT was created at the end of the Second World War” (see www.wto.org), although the major agreements 
were concentrated in agriculture and goods.  
10 By early 2012, the Doha Development Round, initiated in 2001 was still continuing. 
11 The ASAs consider four main aspects in their definition: (i) potential city pairs between the States involved; 
(ii) number or airlines from each of the States with right to provide service; (iii) capacity (frequency of flights 
and number of seats for each pair); and (iv) passenger and/or cargo rates. 
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Table 2.2.2. Modes of supply covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
 
-Mode 1 Cross-border supply: it is defined to cover services flows from the territory of one 
Member into the territory of another Member. 
 
-Mode 2 Consumption abroad: it refers to situations where a service consumer moves into 
another Member’s territory to obtain a service. 
 
-Mode 3 Commercial presence: it implies that a service supplier of one Member establishes a 
territorial presence, by ownership or lease, in another Member’s territory to provide a service. 
 
-Mode 4 Presence of natural persons: it consists of persons of one Member entering the territory 
of another Member to supply a service. 
 
 
The focus here is on Mode 3, as all other modes of supply are already granted. In Table 2.2.3 three 
possibilities of commercial presence and how they related to the Freedoms of Air are indicated. All 
current ASAs banish Mode 3(c)12, which corresponds to the 8th and 9th freedoms of air, with few 
exceptions like the traffic between EU countries and between Australia and New Zealand. In fact, 
even with the most developed ASA typology, the open skies, access to city pairs between countries 
tends to be limited (Odoni, 2009). Only under the newly denominated open areas, like the US-EU 
Open Skies Agreement—see Section 4.2—there could be an inclusion of the 7th, 8th and the 9th 
freedom rights together. As of today, the market access is still today clearly restricted. Even if the 
ASAs allow airlines from a particular country pair to operate in a foreign market, and usually with 
trade limitations, these agreements are a discrimination against airline carriers from third 
countries because the service is restricted to national flag carriers of the signing countries. 
 
Table 2.2.3. Modes of supply services according to airline nationality, customer nationality, and 
territory of service consumption. 
Nationality of the 
carrier with respect 
to the customer 
Operations from a foreign base to the 
customer 
Operations from a local base adjacent to 
the consumer 
Foreign 
MODE 1. E.g. An EU carrier operating 
out of the EU transports US 
passengers to/from the US 
MODE 2. E.g. An EU carrier 
transports US citizens between two 
points out of the US 
 
MODE 3(b). E.g. A EU carrier establishes a 
business in the US to serve routes to or 
from the US. (this includes 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 
and 8th freedoms) 
MODE 3(c): A non-US carrier establishes 
in the US to serve US domestic routes 
(cabotage). 
                                                             
12 The sub-classification 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c), does not correspond to the WTO, and it is specific of this text for 
explanatory purposes. 
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Domestic 
(same nationality) 
MODE 3(a). E.g. A US airline 
transports US passengers from a 
point out of the US (this includes 4th, 
5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th freedoms) 
DOMESTIC. A US-based airline operates 
on routes to and from the US. 
MODE 1. E.g. A US carrier transports US 
citizens to international destinations 
 
A valuable resource for this discussion is the Foreign Direct Investment Restrictiveness index (FDI 
index), developed by the OECD since 2003, which compares the restrictiveness13 of FDI policies in 
each country for a representative range of economic sectors. For the majority of more than 40 
countries included in the comparison, air transport turns to be the sector with more restrictions to 
FDI among 22 sectors considered in the primary, secondary and tertiary economies. The scoring of 
air transport and other representative sectors is shown for a selected group of countries in Table 
2.2.4. Overall, we find that in the air transportation sector there is a substantially higher 
discrimination against foreign investors than in other industries, irrespectively of the particulars of 
the domestic regulation in each of the countries considered in the comparison.  
 
Table 2.2.4. OECD’s FDI Index by country and sector in 2010 
Service sector OECD Non-OECD USA China Germany India 
Air Transport 0.376 0.497 0.650 0.730 0.325 0.788 
Maritime transport 0.272 0.252 1.000 0.850 0.275 0.000 
Surface transport 0.048 0.159 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.000 
Business services 0.073 0.198 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.625 
Communications 0.119 0.166 0.010 0.800 0.000 0.425 
Construction 0.027 0.150 0.000 0.265 0.000 0.350 
Distribution 0.028 0.119 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.431 
Manufacturing 0.029 0.065 0.000 0.252 0.000 0.020 
Real estate investment 0.092 0.357 0.000 0.275 0.000 1.000 
Fishing 0.305 0.350 0.550 1.000 0.275 0.700 
Source: Kalinova et al. (2010). Indexes range from 0=open to 1=closed. Highlighted the highest value 
for each country or group of countries considered. 
 
Another variable of interest is the concentration of the air transportation sector. Figure 2.2.1 
compares the consolidation of various industries with a global reach, showing that the airline 
industry is much more fragmented than a similar service industry like maritime transport or 
manufacturing sectors like motor vehicles or cellphone devices. This higher level of fragmentation 
of the airline industry is even more significant considering the low number of big-player carriers 
existing in each country. As a matter of fact, despite the perception that a lower level of aggregation 
                                                             
13 There are four main types of restrictions considered in the FDI index:  
(i) Foreign equity limitations, (ii) screening or approval mechanisms, (iii) restrictions on the employment of 
foreigners as key personnel, and (iv) operational restrictions.  
The methodology for the 2010 update of the FDI Index is described in Kalinova et al. (2010). 
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is symptomatic of a competitive industry and this is usually associated with low barriers of entry, in 
the global scale the story is different: this fragmentation can be associated with the preponderance 
of national champions that capture the rents from existing barriers to foreign carriers in their 
domestic markets.  
 
 
Figure 2.2.1. Global share of the largest airlines in the airline industry and other selected industries. 
Source: Boston Consulting Group- Retrieved from Swelbar (2011). 
 
From Michael Porter’s competitive strategy analysis it can inferred that when industry 
fragmentation is caused by “underlying industry economics that cannot be overcome”, which in this 
particular case can be associated with the entry barriers confronted by airline carriers in 
international markets, firms may look for marginal profitability by strategic positioning (Porter, 
1980). From a wide range of strategic alternatives when firms have to contend with a fragmented 
industry, we observe that a very significant driver in the industry is that, still today, most carriers 
have a clear focus geographic area. Other factors that can also be observed in the industry are a 
specialization by customer type, which explains the business model distinction between low-cost 
carriers and network legacy carriers; specialization by type of order, which translates to the 
differentiation between point-to-point and hub-and-spoke networks, as well as the different 
marketing strategies for capturing business and leisure travelers; and increase value added of the 
service, arguable ascribable to services like seamless itineraries and higher frequencies offered by 
airlines with code share and strategic alliances. All of these factors together, among others, help to 
provide a framework to explain the different internationalization strategies of carriers. 
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2.3 Internationalization of airlines 
 
Airlines around the world pursue different and evolving business plans. Despite the existence of 
similar exposure barriers to entry, this translates into diverse internationalization strategies. 
Historically, the main distinction among carriers has been between ¨traditional¨ incumbent legacy 
carriers and incoming low-cost carriers. On a network basis, a similar discrimination can be made 
between carriers operating a hub-to-spoke network and point-to-point carriers. Towards the 
future, it could be argued that the main divergences among large carriers might be between aligned 
carriers in multi-lateral airline alliances, i.e. the Global Airline Alliances, and those other carriers 
that remain unaligned. By any criteria, all the largest carriers in each side have a common 
denominator: the pursuit of international network expansion.  
Ramón-Rodríguez et al. (2010) developed a theoretical analysis of the reasons of airlines for going 
international. The authors transferred what they referred as the “traditional internationalization” 
to explain the process of international expansion taking place in the air transportation sector. Table 
2.3 provides their own summary of their findings. In next sections, the internalization models of 
three groups of carriers—low-cost carriers in Section 2.3.1, Persian Gulf’s global connectors in 
Section 2.3.2 and network legacy carriers in Section 2.3.3—provide a current overview of the 
possibilities of international expansion observed within the industry.  
 
Table 2.3.1. Internationalization theories applied to the airline industry.  
 
Industrial organization theories 
• Traditional companies gain competitive advantages from their reputation and brand, company 
prestige, their size and know-how, as well as from government protection and barriers to entry. 
They also benefit from economies of scale and density thanks to the formation of alliances. 
• Low cost airlines expand internationally due to the higher competitiveness of their product, 
achieved through technological innovation and a better know-how giving rise to the 
development of a re-engineering of processes on all levels, including the distribution of the 
product and the use of the Internet. Furthermore, they are based in secondary or regional 
airports (which have lower barriers to entry), the ideal channel from within which to develop 
their internationalization strategy. 
 
Oligopolistic behavior theory  
• Airlines imitate each other with respect to price strategies and technological innovations that 
represent competitive advantages for international expansion. 
• Oligopolistic behavior theory explains not only why airlines internationalize but also how they 
achieve it and the different modes of entry into international markets. 
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Life cycle theory 
• The airline market is in a mature phase of its life cycle, and is an example of how aggressive 
competition through pricing together with technological advances is capable of rejuvenating a 
sector. 
 
Risk diversification  
• The creation of diverse routes by airlines between disparate points constitutes a strategy to 
manage possible adverse circumstances in a specific location. 
• Internationalization, through FDI or any other mechanism facilitates this diversification as it 
means that a company is not dependent on a sole market for its survival. 
 
Internationalization as a sequential process 
 
• Newly-created airlines usually begin by offering their transport service on international routes 
through code sharing or slot leasing where it believes that there is considerable potential 
demand. The consolidation of these pioneer routes may lead companies to extend their 
operations to new projects and routes in order to reap greater returns. They may acquire 
foreign carriers or establish a hub on foreign soil. 
• It is common to see airlines using the different internationalization strategies simultaneously, 
giving rise to a combination of entry modes. 
• As the competitiveness of the market intensifies, airlines opt for international expansion 
strategies that require greater commitments. The liberalization of the European airline 
industry stimulated the formation of alliances and the entrance of LCCs expanding with FDI 
strategies. 
 
Localization theory  
 
• The search for new markets, avoiding, where possible, rivalry with other companies is a 
determinant of the expansion strategies of carriers. 
• The liberalized air transport market and the role of governments as regulating agencies also 
influence the internationalization process. 
• The formation of alliances avoids the interference of governments and the association of 
airlines shows an expansion strategy based on the most important routes across the world. 
 
Transaction cost theory  
 
• Quality control, autonomy or adaptability of the carrier to changes in demand and in general 
the ability of the airline to reduce uncertainty among customers, avoiding opportunism and 
protecting the carrier’s reputation, together constitute the key advantages of 
internationalization. 
 
Institutional theory  
 
• The role of the institutional environment not only affects where an airline positions itself but 
also how it carries out its expansion process. Sometimes, the positioning of an airline depends 
more on where it is allowed to establish a base rather than where it would like to operate from. 
Printed from Ramón-Rodríguez et al. (2010). 
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2.3.1 Low Cost Carriers 
  
Low-cost carriers (LCCs) are carriers with different practices and resources to the traditional full-
service network legacy carriers which enables them to operate at a lower cost. The LCC business 
model has been usually characterized by several characteristics associated with productivity 
efficiencies over the traditional carriers: single aircraft type (usually Airbus 320 or Boeing 737 
family), “point-to-point” network instead of a hub-and-spoke network with connecting traffic, lower 
wage rates, single class cabin, direct sale of tickets instead of using the traditional global 
distribution channels (GDS), only one-way fare per flight at each point in time, and no seat 
assignments. The reality is that today most LCCs have diverted their strategies and they only meet 
some of the archetypical criteria of the low-cost business model. In fact, among the LCCs in Europe 
and North America only the successful Irish carrier Ryanair meets all the characteristics above 
(Belobaba, 2009, Klophaus et al., 2012). 
Some of the low-cost carriers are opting for expanding their successful business models to 
international operations. Their aim is to extend their network to whichever routes they can 
continue operating with similar returns on investment. In this process, LCCs are making use of 
tactical alliances, i.e. interline and code share, to a significant lesser extent than network legacy 
carriers. Indeed, at the time of this thesis, no LCC have planned to join a Global Airline Alliance 
without previous significant changes in their business model. Additionally, there are few examples 
of successful strategic alliances between LCCs.  
Internationalization for an LCC arises as a natural evolution when operating in mature markets 
with relative scarcity of further attractive routes to operate, significant exposure to down-market 
moves of legacy carriers, and/or the entry of younger LCCs with lowest cost structures that 
challenge the incumbent LCC. This need, however, has not been as urgent as for network legacy 
carriers due to LCCs’ lower fares resulting from a lower cost structure. Indeed, this has allowed 
LCCs to operate a more extensive set of domestic scheduled routes where they are able generate a 
critical demand. Another natural limitation to international expansion is their single business 
model with a limited range of aircraft typology, which limits flight range. 
Ryanair, a leading LCC holding 45% of the market share of LCCs in Europe, might be close to reach 
this market depletion point. The Irish firm has a market share of over 75% at nearly half of its bases 
(de Wit and Zuidberg, 2012), indicating fewer opportunities for growth within its current network 
of secondary airports. Future opportunities might arise by serving from primary airports (in 2012 
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Ryanair already operated in Barcelona and Madrid) or by continuing the expansion of its network 
of secondary airports to other countries. Ryanair, together with easyJet (the second largest LCC in 
Europe) are point-to-point non-connecting carriers and, so far, they have not developed tactical 
alliances with other carriers and all their network expansion has been through organic growth. At 
the same time, both LCCs are the only unaligned airlines in the world that have established main 
bases outside of their borders, although these are still in their same economic and regulatory 
market, the European Union.14 Ryanair’s top management, however, has shown an interest in 
initiating a low-cost transatlantic service in the near future.15 
Southwest and JetBlue, which account for a 65% and 18%, respectively of the market share of LCCs 
in the US (de Wit and Zuidberg, 2012), also might find incentives to expand their services abroad. 16 
A key factor is how the ongoing process of unit costs’ convergence of US legacy carriers with the 
traditionally more cost-effective Southwest and JetBlue (see Tsoukalas et al., 2008) triggers both 
airlines’ resilience to challenging competitors in the US market. As a matter of fact, the business 
models of Southwest and JetBlue and the network legacy carriers have more limited differences 
than in a similar comparison in Europe, as both US LCCs cannot be described anymore under the 
paradigm of non-associative point-to-point airlines.  
Regarding network architecture, in 2010 Southwest had roughly half of its flights through one of 
their six hubs, increasing this ratio from 40% in 2000; while JetBlue still had more than 80% of its 
flights through one its four hubs, even considering that it had moved beyond its only hub in 2000, in 
JFK-New York City (Swelbar, 2011). Although the hub dependence of Southwest is the lowest 
among the large US carriers, a significant and increasing weight of its operations corresponds to 
connecting passengers by a hub-to-spoke model.17 Regarding collaborative agreements, JetBlue has 
interline agreements with American Airlines and the foreign legacy carriers Aer Lingus, Icelandair, 
South African Airways, and Lufthansa (code share); Southwest only has a limited code share 
agreement with Mexican carrier Volaris, initiated in 2009. So far, both airlines have limited their 
international operations to the Caribbean. 
                                                             
14 Ryanair (Ireland) has bases in Ireland, UK, Germany, Italy and Spain; and easyJet (UK) has bases in UK, 
Italy, Spain and Germany. By early 2012, Air Berlin, also unaligned although with a scheduled entrance in 
oneworld at the end of 2012, practiced a hub and spoke strategy from Germany (Berlin, Dusseldorf, and 
Nuremberg) and Spain (Palma). 
15 E.g. http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/kfgbauidqlau/rss2/ 
16 Including AirTran in Southwest Airlines. 
17 The purchase of AirTran, with a strong hub presence in Atlanta, in 2011, might reinforce this trend. 
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Among the largest LCCs in the rest of the world, Air Asia, a leading low-cost carrier from Malaysia, 
represents a particular case of international growth through affiliate airlines.18 Thai AirAsia and 
Indonesia AirAsia are expanding AirAsia’s network to neighbor countries. AirAsia’s latest venture is 
a long-haul LCC, AirAsia X, based in Kuala Lumpur, which is trying to succeed where other long-haul 
services like Newark’s People Express, Hong Kong’s Oasis and Ottawa’s Zoom failed. Qantas’ 
subsidiary Jetstar and the most recent Singapore Airlines’ Scoot are two other low-cost carriers 
introducing long-haul services with twin-aisle aircrafts.19,20  
A limitation for international long-haul services is that some of the competitive advantages that 
LCCs have over network legacy carriers in short-haul flights are undermined in long-haul sectors. 
Francis et al. (2007) concluded with 2003 data that a low-cost long-haul operation could only 
achieve a 20% cost advantage over network carriers, while the advantage in short-haul legs was 
around 50%. First, long-haul routes cannot be operated by the A320 or B737, which are the most 
popular aircraft, due to range limitations, which would end up with the cost-savings of fleet 
commonality. Second, as pointed out by Morrell (2008), the hub connection with passengers from 
feeding markets would become crucial, as the longer the flight distance, the bigger the catchment 
areas need to be to maintain the route density. Third, Morrell also indicates that although some cost 
efficiencies from a higher seat density and lower crew salaries could be achieved, the complications 
of the service (in-flight catering, schedule constraints from night curfew), and the higher effects of 
fuel costs, would give a more limited room for exploiting the strengths of the LCC’s business model.  
Overall, low-cost carriers in the domestic markets at both sides of the North Atlantic show 
symptoms of stagnation in network growth. Carriers like Southwest, Ryanair or easyJet have a long 
record of successful decisions, and they might find new ways to capture new demand. Moving to 
primary airports, growth by acquisition, and connection of passengers (or hub feeding 
intensification) are three of the business strategies in their portfolio. The provision of 
intercontinental services through code share agreements is a natural evolution for connecting 
airlines, as already practiced by a leading LCC like JetBlue. Going further, Wensveen and Leick 
(2009) have even proposed an interlining alliance of LCCs around the world for achieving profitable 
long-haul operations. In the shorter term, results of AirAsia X, Scoot and JetStar in Asia and Oceania, 
                                                             
18 AirAsia, is the largest Asian low-cost carrier, and receiver of the World’s best low-cost airline award in 
2009, 2010, and 2011, given by Skytrax, a market-research firm specializing in aviation. 
19 Long-haul is a flight leg that cannot be operated by single-aisle aircrafts due to range limitations. It 
corresponds de facto to flights requiring 6 hours or more of flight. 
20 For more details about Scoot launch plans see http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/singapore-
air-unveils-budget-airline-scoot.html. 
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and, tentatively, Ryanair in the transatlantic, might be leading the strategic movements on 
international services for the rest of LCC carriers in the industry. 
 
2.3.2 The alternative strategy of the Persian Gulf’s global connectors 
 
A rising group of airlines based in the Persian Gulf —Emirates, Qatar Airways, Etihad Airways, 
Saudi Arabian—have found their own way to grow in international services with a strategy with 
echoes to the classical network carriers. The so-called Gulf carriers are exploiting hub-and-spoke 
operations in the intercontinental flow between Europe on one end, and Asia and Australia on the 
other, with a single hub in a region with a great geographic advantage, the Persian Gulf. Other 
carriers in the region, though at a smaller scale, are Saudi Arabian, Gulf Air, and Kuwait Airlines. 
Additionally, Turkish Airlines, a Star Alliance member, has a network model with similarities to the 
Gulf carriers. 
For the Gulf carriers internationalization can be understood as a need to overcome the lack of an 
extensive domestic market, as well as an opportunity to take benefit of the competitive advantage 
of being in the geographic center between regions with a continuously increasing flow, which 
includes some of markets with the greatest growth potential. Arguably, these airlines are 
revolutionizing the reach of the hub and spoke mechanism and its role in the global market. An 
azimuthal projection of the routes of the three largest Gulf carriers—Emirates, Etihad Airways, and 
Qatar Airways—in Figure 2.3.1, exhibits the geographical convenience of the Gulf’s hubs for 
connecting intercontinental routes. 
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Figure 2.3.1. Route maps over 1500 miles for three largest Gulf carriers: Emirates (red), Etihad 
Airways (yellow), and Qatar Airways (pink). 
 
A main competitive advantage of Gulf carriers arises on their routes between secondary airports. 
Traditional network legacy carriers would serve these OD markets by providing a succession of 
three flight legs: a short-haul flight connecting the origin spoke with a hub, an intercontinental long-
haul between two hubs, and a short-haul flight to the destination spoke. However, Gulf carriers 
connect the two nodes via their Gulf’s global connector hub. Hence, with two long-haul flights, 
instead of three flight legs, they provide a higher path quality for passengers. This adds to reduced 
costs in airport charges in their hubs (Brützel, 2006). As pointed out by O'Connell (2011) in his 
analysis of Emirates’ business model, the development of these extensive networks are 
underpinned by the 6th freedom of air with the countries where the firms operate.21 
The development of large airlines with hub in the Gulf is supported by the construction and 
expansion of enormous airports in the region. In Dubai, a new large airport, Al Maktoum 
International22, is under construction, which will be added to the Emirates’ hub of Dubai 
International airport —already the third airport in the world in volume of international passengers 
                                                             
21 The sixth freedom is the right to carry passengers or cargo from a second country to a third country by 
stopping in the airline’s country. 
22 Formerly known as “Dubai World Central” airport, it is projected to have five parallel runways and the 
capacity for having four aircrafts landing at a time. 
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(ACI, 2011)- and also under current expansion. With both airports Dubai will have a capacity of 160 
million passengers in 2020.23 These developments go in hand with the expansion of Etihad Airways’ 
and Qatar Airways’ hub airports in Abu Dhabi and Doha, respectively, among other developments in 
other airlines’ bases in the Gulf region, as O'Connell (2011) reported. It is worth mentioning that by 
2015 or 2016 the three current airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Qatar will have more capacity 
than Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaulle and Frankfurt together (The Economist, 2010). 
The international growth of the Persian Gulf carriers is a reason of concern for the largest European 
network carriers, all of them members of global alliances, who see their services between Europe 
and Asia, Australia, and South Africa threatened by the rise of these high-flier competitors. In fact, 
Emirates, which is the largest and most profitable Gulf carrier, became in 2009 the world‘s largest 
international airline in revenue passenger-km terms. Additionally, the actual orders of wide-body 
seats of Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways combined overpassed those of the entire US carriers’ 
fleet (Schulte-Strathaus, 2011).24 By 2010, Emirates had more than 140 airplanes in order, 
including 50 A380s, and without plans of delaying or cancelling orders (The Economist, 2010). 
The development of the Gulf carriers responds to clear national policies of the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Qatar: to invest in new economic sectors that prepare the country to maintain 
its economic status in a post-oil era. From a public perspective, the role of the airlines is not to 
maximize their profitability in the short-term, although they have proven to develop a profitable 
business model, neither to connect these micro-states to the rest of the world, but to create a 
transport network that help their countries to be world class hubs in the flow between the East and 
the West. Shortly, UAE and Qatar pursue to be global trade centers as well as attractive touristic 
destinations. This goal of economic expansion explains the alignment of the governments with their 
airlines to increase the number of destinations and the fleet size, which makes of the development 
of public infrastructures that can accommodate this growth a priority.  
The active role of the public sector is being criticized by European carriers, mainly Lufthansa —the 
largest European carrier—which accuses the Gulf carriers of distorting competition and allege that 
they get hidden subsidies. These criticisms have been responded by airlines like Emirates 
proclaiming the absence of subsidies, while attacking the European allied airlines and the 
                                                             
23 Expected date of full operations for Al Maktoum International is around 2020. An expansion at Dubai 
International will already increase its capacity to 75 million by the end of 2012 and 90 million passengers by 
2018. (Dron, 2011). 
24 By 2011, Mr. Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus was the secretary General of the Association of European Airlines 
(AEA).  
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grandfather rights in the slot allocation process in European airports (see Emirates, 2011). 
However, pressure from domestic carriers could be conditioning European national regulators’ 
willingness to allow Gulf carriers to increase their number of airports under service. In particular, 
German officials do not plan to modify the air transport agreement (ATA) with United Arab 
Emirates —who by their part have adopted an open-skies policy—limiting to four the number of 
cities that Emirates can serve in Germany, arguing that the current agreement is based “on the size 
of the mutual home markets” (Kingsley-Jones, 2011).  
This author has not found any evidence of subsides to Gulf carriers in the literature, but the 
acknowledgment that in the Persian Gulf countries there are no income taxes and that non-skilled 
workers are recruited from lower income countries in Asia and its wages are significantly low. A 
legitimate source of cost-saving is the lower fuel costs in the Gulf, due to lower supply chain costs 
associated with the proximity to oil infrastructures (O'Connell, 2011), although a contrary 
argument here is by The Economist (2010), claiming that Gulf carriers pay more for fuel at their 
hubs than in other airports abroad due to a lack of oil refineries infrastructure in the area. True or 
not, the rest of advantages pointed here would arise even before considering possible efficiencies in 
the rest of structural operating costs that depend on technical and managerial talent.  
In the paradigmatic case of Germany, after more of a decade of Emirates operating from two 
secondary airports (Düsseldorf and Hamburg)—in addition to serving from Lufthansa’s hub-
airports of Frankfurt and Munich—Emirates has become the leading airline in the Düsseldorf-Asia 
markets, surpassing Lufthansa and other network carriers by providing two daily services with 
Dubai and, from there, the rest of Emirates’ network (Grimme, 2011). This reality that Grimme 
studied for the case of Emirates in Düsseldorf corroborates the competitive advantage that the Gulf 
carriers have in some intercontinental markets from/to Europe, especially at secondary nodes.  
However, there are some disadvantages in these hub operations that may make Gulf’s carriers less 
attractive for customers in the catchment area of European network legacy carriers’ hub airports. 
For the case of two secondary German cities, Hamburg and Düsseldorf, Grimme proves that 
Emirates is in a critical competitive disadvantage in larger travel distances to the most demanded 
Asian itineraries because of the connection via Dubai, which brings to longer total travel times for 
the customer than with Lufthansa’s alternative. Grimme also argues that the transfer for most of the 
flights in Dubai is at unpleasant early morning hours. Additionally, potential consumers may have 
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more schedule displacement25 than with Lufthansa, given the higher daily frequency flights of the 
German carrier.  
Overall, Emirates is not a leader in the business passengers’ sector in neither Hamburg nor 
Düsseldorf. However, Grimme finds that Emirates does not offer the lowest fares—which are 
offered by Turkish Airlines, Finnair, Air France-KLM, Air China and Swiss. This suggests that there 
might be retained preferences, whether the reason be the ease of connections by the two long-haul 
legs connection via Dubai, or Emirates’ stronger brand recognition than the rest of airlines other 
than Lufthansa. The latter argument could be well based if we considered the reported marketing 
efforts of Emirates—4% of its annual revenues (O'Connell, 2011)—which has had especial visibility 
via their sponsorship of many large sport events with global exposure.  
Finally, the bold expansion of the Gulf carriers might not give enough room in the market for all of 
them to be global carriers. As a matter of fact, Saudi Arabian Airlines planned to join Sky Team as a 
full member by 2012, and similar movements from other Gulf carriers to oneworld and Star 
Alliance should not be dismissed. Different movements have been those of Qatar Airways and 
Etihad Airways, who by 2011 had been executing stock purchases in European carriers in financial 
distress. Ultimately, the Gulf carriers are not only expanding their network at a fast pace, but also 
developing their business model in a global industry that they aspire to reshape. 
 
2.3.3 Network Legacy Carriers 
 
In all regions worldwide where start-up passenger carriers have entered following the low-cost 
business model, incumbent network legacy carriers (NLCs) have been exposed to their lower fares. 
This has posed a competitive pressure on NLCs during the last decades. Among all the challenges 
posed, Tretheway (2004) and Kahn (2004) argued that the greatest effect of low-cost carriers on 
NLCs had been to undermine their price discrimination ability.  
The responses of NLCs to this challenge have been varied. Some carriers attempted to emulate low-
cost carriers’ business model, such as Aer Lingus and US Airways; others launched low-cost 
subsidiary carriers to compete directly with low-cost carriers on the domestic routes, like Delta 
                                                             
25 Schedule displacement is the difference between the time that the passenger would like to depart and the 
closest departing time available. This displacement or “wait time” can be modeled as a contributor to the total 
trip time of a given passenger (Simpson & Belobaba, 1992).  
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Airlines (Song), Continental (Continental Lite), United Airlines (Ted) Air Canada (Tango, Zip), or 
bmi (bmibaby). Most of these “airlines within an airline” failed. However, as of 2012, two of the 
largest network legacy carriers, Singapore Airlines and Iberia, were launching their low-cost 
carriers, Scoot and Iberia Express, respectively. Instead, for the majority of surviving legacy carriers 
the strategy has been to exploit the differences with low-cost carriers, and to turn them into a 
competitive advantage. 
Some of the most valuable features supplied by NLCs are connecting flights, wide network coverage 
of domestic and international destinations, frequent-flier programs, and business class cabins. On 
the demand side, these services are valuable for travelers requiring a more extensive network, and, 
as a general rule, also a higher service quality. As part of this package of superior services, network 
carriers are expected to offer their customers seamless connections with domestic and 
international destinations. For the former, NLCs have been transferring capacity to regional 
partners (see Dennis, 2007), while the provision of a wider international network has been made 
possible by partnering with foreign airlines. 
As shown previously in Chapter 1, there are diverse collaborative frameworks for building an 
international network. An extended and basic scheme for NLCs, but also common to low-cost 
carriers and Gulf global connectors, is the bilateral code share agreement with foreign airlines. In 
open-skies markets, like the European Union, trans-border mergers and acquisitions provide the 
full-integration option, and examples are Air France-KLM, IAG, or the Lufthansa Group. With no 
exclusion to these two frameworks of collaboration, multilateral alliances are an intermediate and 
complementary option of collaboration, and they are found in the form of the three Global Airline 
Alliances (GALs). 
On a worldwide scale, the reality is that, as of today, most of the largest carriers have joined one of 
the GALs. By 2011, 21 of the 23 largest passenger airline groups in the world—when ranked by 
revenue—were enrolled in a GAL.26 Only Emirates (9th) and Southwest Airlines (13th) remained 
unaligned. More interestingly, when considering the airlines with more than $3B in revenues (top-
41), although just two-thirds (26) were in a GAL ( see Figure2.3.2), from the remaining 13 carriers, 
four had a scheduled entry (Air Berlin, China Airlines, Saudi Arabian Airlines, Malaysia Airlines), 
and two had plans to join a GAL (Eva Air, Hainan Airlines), while eight of the remaining airlines 
                                                             
26 The mention to “airline group” is required as large carriers like American Airlines, Lufthansa, or Japan 
Airlines have consolidated revenues with subsidiary firms; similar cases are the multi-brand merged airlines 
like Air France-KLM Group, United-Continental Holdings or International Airlines Group. 
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could be labeled as low-cost carriers (Southwest, Ryanair, easyJet, GOL, JetBlue) or Gulf global 
connectors (Emirates, Qatar Airways).27 Overall, it can be observed that almost all the largest 
airlines in the world that have not opted for the cost-minimization business model of the low-cost 
carriers, or the expansion plan of the Gulf carriers, have decided—or plan to—join a Global Airline 
Alliance.  
When considering middle-sized airlines, i.e. between $3B and $0.3B, (105 airlines) the proportion 
of aligned airlines decreases dramatically to less than 20%, despite having doubled the number of 
enrolled airlines during the last five years. This author proposes four complementary 
interpretations of this lower proportion of aligned airlines:  
(i) 30% of the unaligned airlines are not among the three largest airlines in their country, 
which is a relevant factor because with the exception of the two largest economies in the 
world, the US and China, each GAL has no more than one member per country to avoid a 
significant network overlapping between existent and incoming members;  
(ii) An additional 10% of the unaligned airlines in this category can be characterized as low-
cost or regional carriers; 
(iii) Some of the carriers might not have been admitted due to lower service quality 
standards; and 
(iv) GALs are still in a growth phase. As a matter of fact, by early 2012 nearly an 8% of these 
unaligned middle-size carriers were in process of joining a GAL in the next two years. 
 
 
                                                             
27 In this list of 41 airlines, this author found that Alaska Airlines could not be classified under any of the 
categories presented without controversy.  
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Figure 2.3.2. Distribution of airline groups according to their alliance of enrollment in 2011, 2006 and 
2000. Note: The difference from the top of the bar to 100% corresponds to unaligned airlines. 
 
2.4 Potential benefits of strategic alliances 
 
The growth of airlines’ international networks, and the use of collaborative strategies for this 
purpose, has to be interpreted as a strategy of airlines to improve their profitability by exploiting 
new revenue sources while reducing marginal costs. In this direction, multilateral strategic 
alliances have the potential of achieving diverse benefits from a close collaboration between 
airlines. These gains may vary from those achievable with code share routes to the potential 
benefits associated with close partnerships that resemble an international multi-brand airline.  
Although this Section focuses on the advantages of alliances for exploiting efficiencies and 
generating new revenue sources, some of the implicit trade-offs associated cannot be disregarded. 
In fact, although alliances can contribute to develop code share routes in an airline’s network—an 
analysis in Chapter 3—joining an alliance might be a restraint for pursuing growth strategies, a 
view subscribed by many low-cost carriers and the Gulf’s global connectors. Aside, an aligned 
airline can market its GAL enrollment as an added value feature for its customers, potentially 
generating extra demand and, as well, the GAL’s global marketing platform can be leveraged by 
local airline brands to reach a much larger market. At the same time, this dual brand dimension of 
GAL-airline might also have the undesired effect of the airline brand losing weight in the 
international or domestic market, as pointed out by Iatrou & Oretti (2007). 
Despite an extensive literature on the benefits of alliances from the perspective of manufacturing 
businesses, the particularities of the air transport business brings us to the need of addressing the 
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economic incentives of global airline alliances from a particular basis. Most of the benefits of 
multilateral airline alliances are linked with the reinforcement of the competitive advantages of 
other key features of the airline industry like the hub-spoke network, code share routing, and 
antitrust immunity for airlines coordinating joint operations. In addition, global alliances also 
contribute per se with initiatives like joint marketing and exclusive membership. Following, we can 
decompose the most relevant potential gains to allied members that global alliances can 
amalgamate. 
 
2.4.1 Economies of scale 
 
Economies of scale are the decrease in unit costs with respect to the increase in network size and 
the provision of services. They can also derive from learning, specialization and the distribution of 
fixed costs over a larger output (Iatrou & Oretti, 2007). There can be potential economies of scale 
with aircraft size, as the unit costs in fuel and crew, among other items, increase to a lesser degree 
than the available seats-km if laboring under the ceteris paribus assumption when considering 
aircraft technology and pilots’ seniority. Stage length also provides economies of scale as fixed costs 
in airport-based costs are the same for a longer covered distance. Fuel costs also reduce with longer 
stage lengths as there is lower fuel consumption at cruise altitude and the higher consumption in 
takeoff and descent are distributed over a longer period. Alliances with foreign airlines bring to 
more international flights, enhancing economies of scale from a larger average stage length and, 
tentatively, the operation of a larger number of flights. 
As an example of the motivation to create alliances, Romero-Hernandez & Salgado (2005) report 
that after the liberalization of the intra-European airline market, incumbent airlines opted for three 
strategies to exploit economies of scale through expansion: (i) mergers and acquisitions, (ii) setting 
up low cost carriers, and (iii) airline alliances; and from the three, the most sustainable strategy in 
time has been the airline alliances. Airlines wanted to become larger to bring their costs down and 
create a competitive advantage over entering airlines. Nevertheless, the reality is that most 
empirical studies have reported constant returns to scale in network expansions, as concluded by 
Caves et al. (1984), Gillen et al. (1990), Oum & Zhang (1991), and Ng & Seabright (2001), among 
others. 
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From a different perspective, Fan et al. (2001) mentions the diseconomies of scale for airlines 
serving spoke cities with a low frequency. In those airports with limited operations, airlines may 
want to rely on an airline with a larger structure in that base to provide ground operations—i.e. 
handling passengers and cargo, ticket sales, and facilities. Similarly, Kilpi and Vepsäläinen (2004) 
showed the potential economies of scale with inventory pooling spare components for aircrafts 
between airlines, with a decrease in inventory levels of up to 30%. The alternatives are sustaining 
an own inventory of components which has a holding cost, or depending on subcontractors with 
implies to lose sovereignty in a relevant cost source, as well as potential longer lead times. 
Agreements of this kind are far from being uniquely attributable to global alliances—e.g. 
cooperative pooling of aircraft parts initiated in Europe as soon as in the 1960s—although the 
higher degree of cooperation of global alliances obviously enhances the provision of these services.  
Toward the future, global alliances can take benefit from economies of scale by committing in 
pooling spare components and distributing the provision of the inventory, being its titular either 
the alliance or the airlines under a cooperative framework (Kilpi and Vepsäläinen, 2004). Further 
efficiencies can be gained with a standardized fleet. In a similar direction, Iatrou & Oretti (2007) 
pointed out that a joint action of alliance partners in network and fleet planning is needed to take 
full benefit of economies of scale and maximize profits by managing maintenance and ground 
handling; the same authors, however, assume that this ultimate level of cooperation may require 
for the allied airlines a single management team, which is arguably only possible under airline 
mergers.  
 
2.4.2 Economies of density 
 
Economies of density refer to the decrease in unit costs when the transportation services within a 
network increases, not by an expanded network size but a higher traffic density.28 By this, airlines 
might use larger aircraft, i.e. more cost effective, at a higher load factors. Higher network densities 
allow a more intensive use of ground facilities, human capital, and aircraft. This effect led to the 
emergence of hub-and-spoke networks. 
                                                             
28 Oum & Waters (1996) described the economies of density as the lower increase in cost when expanding 
traffic in a network of constant size, whereas they referred to economies of scale as the diminishing average 
cost of increasing network size with constant traffic density. 
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Caves et al. (1984) already argued that the smaller unit costs of US national-coverage airlines 
compared with local airlines during the 1970-1981 period could not explained by the scale of 
airlines but primarily by the higher density of traffic in larger airlines’ network.29 Later, in a similar 
analysis, Brueckner & Spiller (1994) found that a 10% traffic increase led to a 3.75% reduction in 
marginal costs. The implication of these findings is that airlines opt to grow by expanding the 
frequencies on the routes where they are already established, increasing their market share.  
Airlines can increase the flow density by merging or partnering with competing airlines. In the 
particular case of global alliances, aligned airlines can benefit from economies of traffic density in 
two different manners. One is by consolidating operations with airlines with overlapping networks, 
which reduces the number of contenders in the market, and increases the traffic density on their 
routes, diminishing marginal costs. The existence of economies of density can help to explain the 
phenomena of airlines partnering or merging to increase revenues even when they serve the same 
nodes and significant increase in network size is not expected. The reduction in the number of 
competitors may also help the airline to increase market power. The second manner is by funneling 
connecting passengers in code share from partner airlines, resulting in a higher volume of 
passengers per route and a lower passenger-mile cost. Compared to a non-collaborative scenario, 
aligned airlines can serve connecting passengers that before would have been handled by the 
partner airline with a low route density or by another competing airline.  
 
2.4.3 Economies of scope 
 
This term was first coined by Panzar and Willing (1981) to refer to the cost savings achieved by 
having a multiproduct enterprise in which the joint cost of producing two or more outputs is less 
than the sum of the costs of producing each output by itself. In the field of air transportation this 
term is intrinsically associated with spatial scope. Economies of scope appear when as an airline 
adds new nodes, i.e. destinations, to their network, the production costs for all the new routes that 
the new nodes generated is lower for an incumbent carrier than if the new routes were served by a 
new company created ad hoc. This source of efficiency is especially remarkable when airlines 
operate with a network close to a theoretically pure hub-and-spoke network with n airports, for 
                                                             
29 Other studies reporting economies of density in airlines are Oum & Zhang (1991); Gillen, Oum, & 
Tretheway (1990); Romero-Hernandez & Salgado (2005); Ng & Seabright (2001), and Kumbahar (1990). 
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which the addition of m new destinations increases the number of route combinations between 
destinations in the network from n·(n-1) to (n+m)·(n+m-1). 
A majority of cross panel studies on airline’s costs during the last 30 years have reported 
economies of density and null economies of scale. If economies of scope were not considered it 
should be interpreted that expanding networks is inconvenient, and to increase density would be 
profitable. Nevertheless, this would hold as an inconsistent conclusion considering the effort of 
airlines to increase their network size through natural growth, and the development of alliances, 
mergers, and acquisitions between airlines with complementary networks. As presented by Basso 
& Jara-Díaz (2005), with a large network size there is an increase in the number of products, and 
this comes at a cost advantage.30 
According to Oum et al. (2000), economies of scope are one of the reasons for the formation of 
alliances. In fact, as an airline code shares with a hub of a partner airline, a myriad of new routes are 
added to its destinations’ portfolio at a minor cost. In the study of Basso & Jara-Díaz (2005), the 
authors analyzed the cost function of three Canadian carriers and they found that all three carriers 
had increasing returns to spatial scope. Interestingly, the economies had a diminishing return when 
the number of nodes served increased, i.e. smaller airlines had more to gain from increasing their 
network than larger airlines. Given that, it might be hypothesized that smaller global alliance 
members could achieve larger cost efficiencies from a larger network than larger members, 
although, to the extent of our knowledge, there are no studies supporting this argument. 
 
2.4.4 Larger profits from pricing on code sharing routes 
 
Airlines partnering in a code share agreement not only adjust schedules to provide a seamless trip 
to clients, but they also might adapt fares in multi-airlines code share tickets. Research conducted 
by Jan Brueckner with data from the Passenger Origin-Destination Survey of the US Department of 
                                                             
30 The distinction between the concepts of economies of scale and scope is shown in the following equation, 
where C is for cost, and Q is output. Economies of scope (SC) are then: 
 
SC= [C(Q1) + C(Q2) – C(Q1 + Q2)]/C(Q1 + Q2) 
 
where: C(Qi) is the cost of producing Qi units of output alone, and C(Q1 + Q2) is the cost of producing both Q1 
and Q2. Economies of scope arise if SC > 0, and there are economies of scale when C/Q falls as Q expands. 
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Transportation show that interline alliances lead to lower fares, both in the case of codeshare 
agreements, and under granted antitrust immunity to coordinate prices between airlines 
(Brueckner & Whalen, 2000; Brueckner (2003a).  
Under antitrust immunity, airlines can collaborate in setting prices. In code share agreements 
between unimmunized partners, airlines opt for a fare that is split between the operating carriers 
according to a distance-based prorate formula. In both cases, airlines stimulate demand with lower 
interline fares that can translate into higher profits than without collaboration. This pricing 
behavior contrasts with a non-cooperative case in which the airlines on a multi-leg route sets a 
separate fare for each leg. From that, the multi-stop route is marketed at a higher total fare, by 
summing local fares. In Chapter 4 we review the impacts of pricing on consumers’ welfare. 
A different case is for nonstop travels operated by a single carrier under an agreement between 
carriers on gateway-to-gateway routes. This situation, in which the two or more carriers combined 
have a large market share, may lead to collusive behavior between them. In this case, coordination 
of pricing for the airlines could translate into a higher fare (see Barney, 2002) and, again, higher 
profits. 
 
2.4.5 Marketing and branding benefits 
 
The change in cost structure is not enough to explain the behavior of airlines. The marketing 
strategies and the demand response are crucial in the bottom line of the firm. Above we have seen 
that, by being part of global alliances, airlines can offer consumers a larger and denser global 
network with smoother connections; while from the efficiency gains from economies of scope, scale 
and density, they can also be more competitive in price, boosting demand. Together, the ability of 
airlines to retain and generate passengers in an airline’s international and domestic hub-feeding 
network increases as the firm offers a better product to customers.  
An aligned airline has the potential to sell tickets from its own distribution channels to any location 
that the alliance covers, increasing the utility of the airline to the eyes of the consumer as a 
competent provider of air transportation services for a wide range of destinations, thereby 
potentially increasing the brand loyalty. Another additional marketing benefit is that the consumer 
appraisal can potentially increase by offering a more attractive frequent-flyer program (FFP) 
because passengers can earn mileage on routes all over the world whenever they fly with partners 
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of the FFP’s issuer airline. Vice versa, there are also marketing benefits as FFP holders from aligned 
airlines give value to a partner airline for counting FFP mileage on their routes. In fact, benefits 
from more attractive FFPs from combined networks were reported as soon as in the 1980s (e.g. 
Levine, 1987). 
Advertisement of each airline can increase in hand with its alliance expansion if there is a quid pro 
quo promotion at the marketing channels of the alliance partner members. Airlines can enjoy what 
Iatrou & Oretti (2007) refer as indirect free advertising system, or the global advertising of the 
name and image of the airline with that of the alliance. Additionally, member airlines can undertake 
cross promotion by revealing and marketing the airline that operates in each connection of their 
global network as well as by promoting the variety and excellence of its partners as an added value 
of the airline. Especially in the case of small airlines, the association with larger and better-known 
firms can help signaling to the customer a superior service standard as well as the approval from 
the airline business. This plays an important role in the long term, as the marketing literature 
acknowledges that the levels of customer loyalty increase for companies that are perceived to 
provide a higher quality service.  
Another contribution of alliances is the promotion of service quality among customers, who after 
building an idea of the quality of an airline they apply this perception of airline’s service to the rest 
of markets the airline offers (Iatrou & Oretti, 2007). Hence, there is a potential for alliances to 
position all its members under the alliance brand as a similar market product, by making most of 
the attributes of the alliance brand extensive to all the alliance members. Hence, they can create a 
competitive advantage that is resilient to pricing competition. However, Iatrou & Oretti mention the 
difficulties for developing alliance brands in an industry that has historically being associated with 
the country of origin of the carrier, and they assert that alliances need to emphasize to the customer 
that the merits of the alliance prevails over the nationality of the carrier. On the other hand, at the 
managerial level of many airlines there is the belief that a strong airline brand, i.e. a familiar name, 
should not be phased out in benefit of the alliance brand. Recent mergers of Air France-KLM in 
2004, and Iberia-British Airways in 2010 offer more insights about the difficulties to integrate 
reputed airlines from different countries in a strong brand, as in both cases the two original brands 
were preserved. Again, there is a strong national association and global recognition of the four 
carriers, and the airline managers perceived that the loss of any of the two brands might have 
brought more risk than the potential benefits of a stronger single brand. 
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On the other hand, this author shares the idea of Kleymann & Seristo (2004) that alliance 
membership can bring a better reputation to the airline. In fact, alliance branding may be even 
more relevant for smaller alliance members, who may want to signal service quality and reliability 
to the customers by pairing their brand with the alliance. The importance of brand reputation and 
its association with higher quality standards is important for capturing top-end customers, who are 
less impressed by airfares and give value to other aspects of the service. In fact, the empirical 
research (e.g. Gillen et al. (2008)) shows that although leisure travelers have high price elasticity 
and their choices are mainly driven by treating air transport as a commodity, business passengers 
have a significantly more inelastic demand and, hence, the weight of non-pricing factors like service 
quality or FFPs is higher. Similarly, leisure passengers also tend to be more price inelastic in the 
long-haul than in the short-haul. If smaller airlines are associated to the same quality than their 
alliance partners, quality-sensitive customers may use their (positive) information on the alliance 
to choose the allied airline expecting a higher value from the service. 
Finally, in an industry bipolarized between network carriers in alliances and low-cost carriers, 
especially in the European Union, airlines that are neither the national flag carrier nor a low-cost 
carrier, can differentiate from the latter by strengthening their status as an alliance member. This 
scenario is especially valid for European carriers, as historically there was just one flag carrier in 
each country and some charter or entering airlines have evolved towards network carriers. The 
cases of Air Berlin in Germany (oneworld member in 2012), and Spanair31 (Star Alliance) and Air 
Europa (Sky Team) in Spain, provide an example of non-flag carriers that provide a network 
coverage for whom being an alliance members may have helped to distinguish themselves from 
low-cost carriers—which were competitors in markets in the 3-hour range—in terms of perceived 
service quality. On the other hand, the process of product differentiation needs to be accompanied 
by the fulfillment of safety, quality, IT, and customer service standards that GALs require for 
incoming members to avoid lavishing the alliance’s brand with lower standards. 
 
2.4.6 Financial economies 
 
Some of the potential benefits of diversification have already been outlined from the perspective of 
economies of scope, as this brings to more sources of revenues at a lower marginal cost. In addition, 
                                                             
31 Defunct in January 2012. 
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here we also consider the theory that diversification allows a superior risk return on assets 
(Markowitz, 1952), as well as limited cash flow fluctuations in the firm. Global Airline Alliances 
(GALs), due to its reach, provide its members the best platform available to build a diversified 
portfolio within the same sector. By including destinations in new markets, airlines limit their 
exposure to a limited number of revenue sources. Although globalization makes economies 
increasingly more interconnected, if airlines can generate demand in other countries with lower 
correlation with its domestic economy, this can reduce their exposure to economic downturn in a 
particular country or economic region, which brings to a reduced risk of financial distress for their 
overall business. This feature increases the value of the firm, as reported by Mansi & Reeb (2002) 
for multinational corporations. 
Due to the geographic diversification provided by GALs, airlines could potentially reduce the 
negative effects of economic downturns in their domestic market on average yield and/or load 
factor as other markets might be still sustaining demand. In addition, the dispersion in revenues 
between economic periods is reduced, limiting the tensions on treasury, and reducing the amount 
of working capital required. From another perspective, given a fixed amount of working capital, the 
risk of financial distress would be reduced. These gains, however, would be even higher in case of 
airline mergers with consolidated finances. 
Geographical diversification in the airline industry brings together other great opportunities —
amid other notable limitations. On the one hand, airlines have a potential high mobility of 
resources, as aircrafts and crews can be swapped from one route to another, providing an 
opportunity to allocate resources where the returns are higher whenever the supplies are scarce. 
Here, GALs have widened the range of opportunities to reallocate resources among routes and 
regions; however, this requires a high level of integration between airlines. Also, the national 
regulations applying on international workers limit human resource mobility. In addition, although 
GALs certainly might help to overcome the constraints from trade costs and barriers to entry 
described in Section 2.1, these should not be disregarded as potential limitations to the reallocation 
of services. Finally, the figure of an alliance manager with powers to reassign assets among regions 
and airlines would require of a well-defined internal policy to which the members committed. In 
fact, this higher level of integration would resemble that of merging airlines.  
A particular case of financial economies can be inferred from Rigas Doganis’ description of a crucial 
period in the development of global alliances: 
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The most active period of alliance-making was triggered by the deteriorating financial 
performance of international airlines as they were hit first by the crisis in the tiger economies 
of East Asia from late 1997, then by the economic slow-down in some European states in 
1998, followed by the rapid escalation of fuel prices in 1999. Airline Business in June 1998 
recorded 502 separate inter-airline alliances, 32 per cent more than a year earlier. As the 
global economic downturn began to bite in 2000 and the airline crisis deepened, especially 
after the attacks in New York in September 2001, the alliance frenzy intensified. Many airline 
managers saw alliance building as a key pillar of their survival strategy. 
Doganis (2006). 
 
2.4.7 Joint purchasing 
 
Global alliances can have a negotiating power in benefit of its members, achieving better deals 
when dealing with suppliers. Iatrou & Oretti (2007) mention fuel, spare-parts, maintenance, 
catering, airport charges, or cabin crew training as potential sources of cost reduction. These 
authors state that already in 2000 Star Alliance pursued to save US$150 million each year through 
joint procurement, which only stated for a 0.1% of the total expenses of the alliance members, 
although some analysts thought that there was room for cuts of up to 3.6% of total expenses if the 
management of external services—handling, maintenance, catering and fees, among others—was 
pooled. According to Star Alliance, however, the annual savings from joint fuel purchase is just in 
the range of $27 million (Star Alliance, 2011a). Oneworld claimed to have saved $37.5 million per 
year over the period 2000-2008, although the alliance acknowledged that there was room for larger 
savings.32 
 
In fact, it is not in the joint fuel purchase where significant room to negotiation can be found. There 
is an extensive record of joint procurement on the main airlines’ asset, its aircrafts. A recent 
example of joint procurement is Star Alliance’s project of building a common economy-class seat 
specification for all its member airlines (Air Transport Intelligence, 2011), with a stronger 
emphasis in lowering costs in a commodity resource than in homogenizing the fleet.  
 
                                                             
32 From oneworld Managing Partner John McCulloch. 
Source: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=comm&id=news/ALLIex.xml 
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2.4.8 Control on barriers to entry 
 
As noted in Young et al. (1989), the motives of firms in any industry for establishing international 
joint ventures can be distinguished between the establishment of corporate linkages that benefit 
both firms, like economies of scale, sharing investment risks, learning and exchange, etc.; and the 
role of international cooperation in corporate entry strategies, mainly the entry to new 
geographical markets. In fact, one of the main resources that an airline can offer to alliances is its 
airport slots and hub location, as well as its traffic rights with other countries. 
Access to slots, i.e. a time interval available for scheduling an arrival or departure, is a highly 
relevant barrier to entry at capacity-constrained airports, given the existence of non-tradable rights 
like that of “grandfather rights”, i.e. the preservation of slot times for occupant airlines instead of 
incoming airlines. The degree of control of airports by hub-dominant carriers is such that among 
the 20 largest airports in the world in 2010, on average, over 40% of the flights corresponded to the 
dominant carrier and its affiliated regional carriers.  
The importance of hub control remains in the fact that the dominant airline can exploit economies 
of hub density, lowering costs and attracting passengers with higher frequencies through the hub-
and-spoke network. In addition, airlines in minority and potential entrants can only compete with 
the hub-dominant carrier in a limited number of markets. While this is not necessarily a limiting 
factor for non-connecting airlines, network carriers depend on a critical volume of slots to feed 
their hub-and-spoke network with a suitable range of destinations and/or frequencies. The airlines 
allied with a carrier dominant at a specific airport—e.g. SkyTeam partners of Air France in Paris-
CDG, which holds 50% of the frequencies—can have access to a large European network that, 
otherwise, would be very difficult to serve in their own, given the diseconomies of low hub density 
that the non-dominant carriers face. At the same time, if the alliance partners operate from new 
slots, the hub-dominant carrier is able to reinforce its protection against non-partners competitors 
who will see their potential expansion undercut by the access of foreign network alliances to new 
slots.  
The natural evolution of this trend under a low regulatory pressure is the increasing dominance of 
a hub by a hub-dominant carrier and its alliance partners. Regulators pay also attention to two 
other main potential barriers of entry that alliance members can raise to potential competitors in 
each city-pair market: frequency advantage of allied carriers, and strengthening of the alliance 
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members’ position in the hub, from loyalty effects of FFPs, corporate contracts, and the provision of 
a more extensive network (European Commission & US DOT, 2010). 
 
2.4.9 Learning 
 
A substantial area of benefit comes from the standardization of practices and the sharing of regional 
preferences among the airline members. The learning process can improve airlines’ efficiency and 
the service quality provided, bringing to a potential increase in profits. As a difference to less 
integrative models of collaboration, Global Airline Alliances can be a forum for sharing practices 
and technologies that have proved to be more successful in the managerial and operational sphere, 
for the generation and discussion of new improvements, and the understanding of the preferences 
of customers from different backgrounds.  
By joining a global alliance, incoming partners are firstly exposed to an integration process that 
may require a period of several months or years. During this time, new airlines might have to adapt 
its operations, IT systems, dress-code, office layouts, chain of command, hierarchy structure, 
customer service, fidelity program, safety standards, etc. (Iatrou & Oretti, 2007). If we consider a 
wider range of collaborative scenarios for an given unallied airline—joint venture, bilateral alliance, 
multilateral alliance and merger and acquisition—joining a global alliances implies much more 
assimilation and less mutual adaptation or bidirectional learning, because the incumbent airline 
needs to adapt to a large number of firms with existent standards and procedures. Hence, any 
significant change in the alliance forced by the new partner may affect the rest of the members, 
implying a larger cost of integration for the group. The integration process may help the airline to 
be more competitive if the changes improve the efficiency and service quality. However, this is not 
assured, as the airline may be reluctant to integrate if their competitive advantages are challenged 
during the homogenization. In the other extreme, integration through merger or acquisition 
between equal-sized firms is arguably the best scenario for having mutual learning and it can 
enhance the choice of the best practices of both firms.  
Another primary goal of alliances could be that they are a vehicle for internalizing new skills, in 
particular those that are “tacit, collective and embedded” and, hence, not easily obtained by one’s 
own means (Doz & Hamel, 1998). The insights from the bilateral or multilateral exchange can be 
expanded to the entire firm structure, making of the alliance the spurn for general improvements in 
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the airline. To sum up, two steps of the learning process of an airline joining an alliance can be 
identified: learning through the adaptation process, and by creating value in the day-to-day 
collaboration. 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
 
The largest airlines in the world have been pursuing international expansion as a way to leverage 
their competitive advantages, diversify risks, seek for larger returns than in their domestic markets, 
and benefit from economies of size and density. This process has been conditioned by the 
peculiarities of the airline industry, which were described in Section 2.1. As a service industry, the 
provision of air transport services is affected by higher trade costs and barriers than manufacturing 
industries. Also, in most countries the airline industry is under regulations limiting foreign 
ownership of airlines and making of the air transport probably the most restrictive service sector 
for foreign direct investment in the world. A global liberalization of the air transportation is not 
expected in the next decade, as it has been excluded from the multilateral trade negotiations of the 
WTO. An open question here is to which extent the regulatory barriers prevent airlines from 
organic growth, and which is the impact of other barriers to entry. 
The incentives for internationalization still propel the great majority of airlines to pursue 
international operations. As of 2011, 18 of the 20 largest airline groups in the world had joined one 
of the three Global Airline Alliances (GALs), and during the last decade the enrollment of airlines in 
alliances has shown a clear increasing trend. At this point in time there is a very clear coupling 
between network legacy carriers and GALs. Among middle-sized airlines—considered here as 
airlines with annual revenues between $3B and $0.3B—the proportion of allied airlines is less than 
20%. One reason for this is that actual network carriers are usually of a larger size; also, GALs have 
tended to avoid significant geographic overlapping between members, which limits the chances of 
enrollment of a 30% of middle-sized airlines based in countries with already three GAL members or 
more.  
Regarding the rest of the airline industry, low-cost carriers (LCCs), and a group of quickly 
expanding carriers in the Persian Gulf have opted for other internalization strategies rather than 
multilateral alliances. The latter group, represented by the archetypical example of Dubai-based 
Emirates Airlines, is developing a hub-and-spoke network at the global scale around a Gulf’s hub, 
already challenging the GALs in the flyways between North America, Europe, Africa and Asia. LCCs 
 57  
have not yet shown significant internationalization plans. Indeed, most of the competitive 
advantages of their successful business model would be triggered in long-haul operations and, so 
far, most LCCs have found enough opportunities of expansion in their domestic markets. Despite 
that, LCCs have exploited a few options of international growth, like multi-base short-haul 
expansions within the EU, short-haul subsidiaries in foreign countries, or low-cost long-haul spin 
offs. As of today, no LCC has ever joined a GAL, and there are no prospects of a group of them 
creating a multilateral international alliance.  
The benefits of alliances for enrolled network legacy airlines are majorly based on the economies 
resulting from code share agreements and, tentatively, from the collaboration in pricing and 
scheduling in antitrust immunized partnerships. Coordinated pricing, economies of density, and 
economies of scope have been, so far, the major benefits from collaboration reported in the 
literature. Further gains associated with GALs, like efficiency improvements from learning, cost 
savings from joint purchasing, a more convenient exchange and reallocation of resources, as well as 
marketing benefits from brand recognition and association with the GAL brand, depend on a close 
collaboration between members. This, however, is amid a trade-off between the gains from 
consolidation and the dilution of the competitive advantages of firms, like the consideration of 
“national brand” in the domestic market. Finally, possible constraints imposed by national 
governments to this consolidation process should not be disregarded, and we will treat this in 
detail in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3: The three Global Airline Alliances 
 
Today there are three Global Airline Alliances (GALs) in the world: Star Alliance, SkyTeam and 
oneworld. Formed during the period 1997-2000, more than a decade later half of the seating 
capacity in the world and around 80% of the intercontinental traffic between Asia, Europe, and 
America are served by airlines enrolled in the Global Airline Alliances.33 Since their creation, the 
number of GAL members has been increasing from year to year. The number of destinations 
covered by the three alliances has followed a similar pattern. In this chapter we address the growth 
of the three GALs and their impact on the partnership strategies of their members. Section 3.1 
summarizes the first attempts of international alliances; Section 3.2 introduces the current state of 
the three GALs; and Section 3.3 analyzes in detail the evolution of GALs during the period 2006-
2011 and their impacts on the code share strategies of aligned airlines; finally, Section 3.4 
summarizes the findings of this chapter. 
 
3.1 Historical background 
 
The birth of airline alliances is historically linked to the development of the hub-and-spoke scheme 
and the need of airlines to build domestic and international networks. After the US Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978, US airlines shifted their network structures from a point-to-point scheme 
to a hub-and-spoke scheme as a way to increase their efficiency through hub economies, as 
described previously in Section 2.5.2. Large US carriers established code shares with more cost-
effective regional carriers to feed their larger and more profitable medium-haul and long-haul 
networks, initiating the regional alliances. At a different scale, independent US international 
carriers without strong domestic networks, like Pan American and Trans World Airlines (TWA), 
found themselves at a competitive disadvantage against other competing carriers with both 
domestic and international businesses, as they did not have a domestic network to feed their 
international routes. In fact, both carriers ended up disappearing in 1991 and 2001, respectively.  
International alliances began less a few years later after deregulation, as US airlines realized of the 
benefits of expanding the national hub-and-spoke network structures to a multi-hub international 
                                                             
33 Data from UBM aviation (Emirates, 2011) and Airline Business (2011). “Traffic” refers to revenue 
passenger-distance terms (RPK or RPM in kilometers and nautical miles, respectively). 
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network in which foreign carriers and large US carriers could feed each other’s traffic through code 
sharing connections. Airlines were aware that controlling and operating a hub in a foreign country 
was politically infeasible, because of regulatory limitations to cabotage and foreign ownership of 
airlines. Then, through international alliances, foreign airlines with strong domestic networks could 
feed international routes of their alliance partners, and vice versa, exploiting economies of hub 
density in a multi-hub network. 
According to Iatrou & Oretti (2007), the first international alliance was formed in 1986, when Air 
Florida began feeding British Island with passengers from its US network for the code shared 
British Island’s London-Amsterdam route. Fernandez de la Torre (1999) mentions American 
Airlines and Qantas point-specific alliance in 1985 as the first international code share agreement.  
During following decades, large carriers found themselves in scenarios with high incentives to 
develop intercontinental partnerships. In the US, pressure from low-cost carriers (LCCs) forced US 
legacy carriers to focus more on transatlantic services due to their higher profitabilty. In the 
international scale, competition with smaller-scale, less efficient European carriers put US carriers 
in a better competitive position against its EU competitors; despite that, the impossibility for 
foreign-based airlines to establish hub-and-spoke networks in the EU by themselves forced US 
carriers to partner with European carriers through strategic alliances. In Europe, the smaller 
domestic markets had made foreign services crucial for major carriers, and some European airlines 
had already more than 30% of their profits from transatlantic services (Egan, 2001). The creation of 
the European Union single market, combined with the persistence of barriers to entry, and the 
existence of very few US carriers to form an alliance with, also drove European carriers to 
consolidate through international alliances and mergers. 
Many of the first bilateral and multilateral alliances were in the transatlantic market. KLM and 
Northwest Airlines formed in 1988 the oldest strategic alliance, and the most important bilateral 
alliance of the 1980s. Swissair and Delta Airlines partnered in 1989. In the early 1990s, other 
bilateral strategic alliances in the North Atlantic were British Airways-US Airways, and United-
Lufthansa. From that time, until the consolidation of the three Global Airline Alliances (GALs), there 
were other attempts of multilateral airline alliances. Figure 3.1.1 shows the evolution of the 
international alliances built during the 1990s that did not succeed. 
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Figure 3.1.1. Evolution of multi-airline alliances other than the three current Global Airline Alliances 
during the period 1989-2003. 
Sources: Iatrou & Oretti (2007), Suen (2002), and Knorr & Arndt (2003). 
aBy 2000, SAir Group, Swissair’s holding company, had equity stakes (in parenthesis) in Air Europe 
(49%), Air Littoral (49%), AOM France (49.5%), Crossair (37.6%), LOT Polish (37.6%), Sabena 
(49.5%), TAP Portugal, Volare (34%), Austrian (10%), LTU Group (49,9%), and South African Airways 
(20%), among other airlines. Air Europe and LOT Polish did not join Swissair until 1999; while Air 
Littoral, Portugalia, and Volare Air joined 2000. 
 
Two main characteristics can be pointed out from these alliance projects. First, with the exception 
of the three Global Airline Alliances and Wings (KLM-Northwest Airlines’ alliance), all other multi-
airline alliances were led by Swissair. Second, the majority of the partnering carriers were small- 
and medium- sized European airlines, which were seeking for either a transatlantic link with a US-
based carrier, a strong European alliance, or both. They were pursuing a competitive edge against 
the “Big Three” European carriers (Air France, British Airways, and Lufthansa), in a recently 
liberalized European market (Knorr & Arndt, 2003).  
Failing alliances were characterized by the lack of common, long term goals between partners 
(Iatrou & Oretti, 2007), which is crucial for the success of strategic alliances. Knorr and Arndt 
(2003) also highlighted Swiss’ management hubris as major cause for failure in the European 
alliances. Although Switzerland was excluded from the EU aviation market and Swissair’s Zurich 
hub had a limited growth potential, Swissair demanded the role of the alliances’ undisputed leader. 
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Often, a cause of divergence was in the choice of the US partner. An example is the Alcazar Project, 
for which Swissair refused to accept KLM’s proposed US partner (Northwest) in detriment of its 
more preferred option (Delta Airlines) (Iatrou & Oretti, 2007). Another difference between an 
alliance like Qualiflyer and the current GALs is that in Qualiflyer all the members gravitated around 
Swissair, and, with very few exceptions, all bilateral agreements in the alliance involved Swissair 
(Suen, 2002). As a matter of fact, the absence of a large airline backing Swissair’s multi-airline 
alliances could have been behind these failures, as Swissair’s partners preferred to join the Big 
Three European carriers in the Global Airline Alliances that were been launched. These latter 
options provided small- and medium-size European airlines with a more extensive international 
network, while continuing in the Alcazar Project or European Quality Alliance required looking for 
intercontinental partners –mainly with US carriers. At some point, all Swissair’s alliances 
disintegrated due to defections of its alliance partners to competing groupings. In fact, between 
1996 and 2000, Singapore Airlines, SAS, and the Austrian Airline Group (Austrian Airlines, Lauda 
Air, and Tyrolean Airlines) opted for the Star Alliance; Finnair joined oneworld; and Delta joined 
efforts with Air France to build their own alliance, SkyTeam. 
By 2001, there were still five strategic alliances in the North Atlantic market—Star Alliance, 
oneworld, SkyTeam, Wings, and Qualiflyer—and a frequent flyer program with 10 members in 
Central and South America, the so-called Latinpass. However, based on the frequency of flights 
within each alliance to all the inhabited continents in the world, Fan et al. (2001) considered that, 
by then, only Star Alliance and oneworld could be considered to be alliances with a global reach. 
Soon thereafter, the multi-airline alliance picture stabilized around the three current Global Airline 
Alliances. Each GAL was founded with a major US carrier, one of the “Big Three” European carriers, 
and a major Asian carrier. This intercontinental reach with leading carriers made these alliances 
different from all other attempts represented in Figure 3.1.1. Their first years are briefly 
summarized below, and the main indicators of their current state are reported in next Section 3.2. 
Star Alliance was launched by United Airlines, Air Canada, Lufthansa, SAS, and Thai 
Airways International in May 1997. Before the end of the year, the Brazilian carrier Varig 
Airlines (defunct in 2007) joined Star Alliance. With the entrance of Air New Zealand and 
Ansett Australia in March 1999, the alliance had members in all continents except for 
Africa. It was not until 2006 when South African Airways, the 18th member, became the 
first African airline at Star Alliance, which made of Star a truly global alliance. In 2009, Air 
Canada, Lufthansa, and United and Continental—merged in 2010, received approval to 
form an immunized joint venture within Star in the North Atlantic markets. This high level 
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of cooperation added on top of the antitrust immunity granted during the previous years 
to these airlines and six more members of the alliance. 
Oneworld is a global airline network formed in September 1998 by five airlines from four 
continents: American Airlines, Canadian Airlines (defunct in 2001), British Airways, 
Cathay Pacific and Qantas. Oneworld became operative in February 1999. The first 
member from South America was LAN in May 1999. As well as Star Alliance and SkyTeam, 
most of the members had subsidiary airlines that soon became member affiliates, like 
Iberia Regional Air Nostrum in September 1999, and LAN Express and LAN Peru in May 
1999. It was not until 2010, when a significant group of oneworld members – American, 
British, Iberia, Finnair, and Royal Jordanian- were granted with antitrust immunity within 
the alliance. By then, American, British and Iberia formed an immunized three-way joint 
venture within oneworld in the North Atlantic markets. 
SkyTeam was the last of the multi-airline alliances to be formed. It was founded by Delta 
Air Lines, Aeroméxico, Air France, and Korean Air in June 2000. In 2002, SkyTeam 
members Delta, Air France, Korean Air, Alitalia, and Czech Airlines obtained a common 
grant of antitrust immunity within the alliance. When Continental Airlines, KLM, and 
Northwest Airlines, joined SkyTeam in 2004, SkyTeam surpassed oneworld as the second 
largest alliance in the world, behind Star Alliance. In 2008, after the Air France-KLM and 
the Delta-Northwest mergers, Northwest and KLM joined the immunized SkyTeam joint 
venture. In 2009, Air France-KLM and the merged Delta launched an integrated joint 
venture in the North Atlantic markets. 
Although, the period 1988-2000 was the stage of formation of strategic alliances, of which only the 
three global airline alliances continue today, the agreements between airlines would continue to 
take place during the next decade. Figure 3.1.2 below indicates the code share agreements in force 
for the largest passenger airlines according to the start date, including both GAL and non-GAL 
members. It is worth mentioning that the median age of code shares in 2011 was 5.5 years, while 
for 2005 the median age was 3.5 years. This shows that there has been a remarkable stabilization in 
the formation of new agreements in a short time period. In Section 3.3 we analyze the degree of 
consolidation of code share agreements among GAL members during the period 2006-2011. 
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Figure 3.1.2. Distribution of valid code share agreements in September 2011 by its start date. 34,35  
 
 
3.2 The three Global Airline Alliances today 
 
During the last decade, the scenario of an airline industry with three Global Airline Alliances (GALs) 
has been continuously reinforced by the gradual growth of Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam, 
and the absence of further consolidation between GALs or the rise of new strategic multi-airline 
alliances. As previously shown in Section 2.3.2, by 2011 the majority of large network legacy 
carriers were aligned in one of the GALs. In 2010, they carried 68% of international scheduled 
RPKs, and provided 54.6% of world capacity share. In fact, by 2011 Star Alliance had presence in 
181 countries, oneworld in 145, and SkyTeam in 169 (see Table 3.2.1). 
Despite the entrance of dozens of new members (see Figure 3.2.1), still today all three alliances are 
centered on the founding European and US members, which are the largest carriers in all their 
alliances. As a matter of fact, at the time of this thesis in all GALs the largest member was still the 
founding US carrier and the second largest was a founding EU carrier. Even more, in oneworld and 
SkyTeam, the two largest airline groups—American Airlines, and British Airways-Iberia (IAG) for 
                                                             
34 The figure is constructed from the combination of results from two surveys: Airline Business (2011b) and 
Iatrou & Oretti (2007). We consider all the agreements of both GAL members and a selection of the largest 
unaligned carriers with the largest 200 airlines in the world. The number of agreements in 2011 is 
significantly smaller due to the survey method, consisting on questionnaires returned by the airlines during 
just the first half of 2011. 
35 All the agreements for each of the airlines considered are counted and, hence, double counting issues arise. 
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oneworld; and Delta Airlines, and Air France-KLM for SkyTeam—contributed with more than 50% 
of the total RPKs of the GAL. In Star Alliance, the merged United-Continental and the Lufthansa 
Group, which includes Swiss and Austrian Airlines, among others, cope around 40% of the total 
RPKs of the alliance (see Figures 3.2.2 to 3.2.4). 
 
Table 3.2.1. Summary table of the main indicators of the Global Airline Alliances. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Launch date May 1997 February 1999 June 2000 
Slogan The way the earth connects Oneworld revolves around you Caring more about you 
Headquarters Frankfurt, Germany New York City, USA 
Schiphol Airport,  
The Netherlands 
Full Members (March 2012) 27 12 15 
Countries serveda 181 145 169 
Destinationsa 1135 712 832 
Annual global ASKs (Bn)b 33.5 18.2 20.9 
World capacity sharea 25.2% 13.7% 15.7% 
World international 
scheduled RPKs sharec 
30% 19% 19% 
Annual revenues ($ Bn)b 174 92 112 
a September 2011, b 2010 from Airline Business (2011b); c 2010, IATA, World Air Transport Statistics 
55th edition. 
 
 66  
 
Figure 3.2.1. Evolution in the number of members of the Global Airline Alliances until February 2012. 
 
Amid many similarities, Star Alliance can be differentiated from oneworld and SkyTeam by its 
larger size. In fact, Star Alliance nearly pairs oneworld and SkyTeam together in terms of enrolled 
airlines, ASKs, and annual revenues. Figure 3.2.1 shows how the actual difference in enrolled 
airlines has been gradual since the three GALs were formed in the late 1990s. Next Section 3.3 
analyzes in more detail the implications of this size difference in the partnership strategy of aligned 
airlines. 
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Figure 3.2.2. Star Alliance passenger traffic (RPK) in 2010. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.3. Oneworld passenger traffic (RPK) in 2010. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.4. SkyTeam passenger traffic (RPK) in 2010. 
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The larger size of Star Alliance is not translated into an evenly distributed larger market share in 
the different regional and transcontinental flows represented in Figure 3.2.5. SkyTeam is the largest 
alliance in the Asia-Americas, and the Africa-Europe flows; oneworld surpasses Star Alliance in the 
world’s largest transcontinental market, the Americas-Europa; while Star Alliance is the largest 
group within Europe, Asia, and Australasia, and in the Asia-Europe transcontinental flow. In the 
latter, an unaligned carrier, Emirates, carries 13% of the passengers on its own, challenging directly 
the three GALs from its connecting hub in Dubai.  
A common key factor in the three GALs is their emphasis in the Americas-Europe flow, where they 
have the largest combined share of all the transcontinental flows represented here, an 87%. More 
specifically, in the North Atlantic flow the three alliances have achieved their largest combined 
market share, with a 90% of all the passenger traffic between North America and Europe, according 
to Emirates (2011). In fact, it is in this intercontinental market where the core members of the 
three GALs have achieved their largest degree of integration. As of 2011, nine members from Star 
Alliance, five from oneworld and five SkyTeam each have been granted with antitrust immunity 
from US regulators. And, since July 2011 three carriers at Star Alliance —Air Canada, Lufthansa and 
United-Continental, SkyTeam —Air France-KLM, Alitalia, and Delta, and oneworld —American, 
British, and Iberia36, have each a North Atlantic joint venture, which resembles in many respects to 
a virtual merger across the North Atlantic Ocean. The regulatory framework and policy implications 
of this higher level of cooperation are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                             
36 British and Iberia form from January 2011 a single multi-brand airline holding group, the International 
Consolidated Airlines Group (IAG). 
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Figure 3.2.5. Global passenger traffic flows in 2010.  
Source: UBM Aviation.37 
 
3.3  Analysis of the evolution of the Global Airline Alliances 
 
Our goal here is to understand the differences in the use of Global Airline Alliances (GALs) by 
aligned carriers in their partnership strategy. Section 3.3.1 introduces the details of the two 
databases used in this analysis. Section 3.3.2 presents our findings, which have a special emphasis 
on the evolution of each of the GALs during the 2006-2011 period and the weight of GALs on the 
total volume of code share agreements (also referred here as partnerships) of enrolled carriers. 
 
3.3.1 Methodology 
 
Every year the monthly magazine Airline Business (AB) publishes a list of the code share 
agreements of the largest airlines in the world.38,39 For each of the airlines enrolled in one of the 
GALs there is a list of the carriers in the world top-150 with which the airline has code sharing 
                                                             
37 Edited from Emirates (2011).  
38 The data has been traditionally published in Airline Business’ September volume. 
39 In Airline Business’ terminology, the term “alliance” refers to any code share agreement between airlines. 
In this work, however, the terms “partnership” and “code share agreement” are preferred to avoid confusion 
with the concept of Global Airline Alliances. 
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routes. Usually, the year when the bilateral agreement was initiated is indicated. The survey also 
includes the code share agreements of non-aligned carriers in the top-100 largest airline groups in 
the world by revenue. According to AB, the data is “largely sourced from airline questionnaire 
returns over the first half [of each year]”, which is the criteria adopted in each of the years 
considered here. 
The Airline Business database does not consider the number of routes under code share involved in 
each code share agreement between airlines, despite including a binomial distinction between 
agreements involving either 10 routes or more, or fewer than 10 routes. This limitation is overcome 
here by including airlineroute’s database, which consists of an August 2011 snapshot of all the 
routes under code share agreement—and the code sharing airline—for each of the 200 largest 
airlines in the world, as loaded in the global distribution systems (GDS). This database reports more 
than 1600 pairs of partnerships, and helps to comprehend the extent of code sharing routes in each 
of the aligned airlines.40  
In this section, data from the five Airline Business’ annual surveys on Alliances in the period 2006-
2011 is compiled and analyzed. This time-cross database allows studying the most relevant changes 
in the GALs, as well as the evolution in the use that aligned airlines do of GALs, and how this relates 
to their partnership strategy. Additionally, the number of code sharing routes for each aligned 
airline is studied with the database of airlineroute. 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 
As shown in the previous section, the three GALs have experienced a nearly steady growth in the 
number of members since their creation (see Figure 3.2.1). Since their creation, Star Alliance has 
always been the largest GAL in terms of members, while SkyTeam and oneworld have grown 
following similar trends. The period 2006-2011 has not been an exception, and the difference in 
size between Star Alliance with respect to SkyTeam and oneworld has been reinforced as the 
                                                             
40 Report available at http://airlineroute.net/2011/08/08/cs-aug2011. 
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number of entering members in each GAL during the five-years period has been 7, 5, and 4, 
respectively.41  
This emphasis on GALs’ size is related to their mission as frameworks for the development of 
bilateral code share agreements between GAL partners. Figure 3.3.1 shows the average number of 
partnerships of member airlines during the period 2006-2011. This indicator is built by adding the 
number of partnerships of the aligned airlines in a given year, and dividing it by the number of 
members that same year. It can be observed that members of oneworld and SkyTeam have had a 
constant number of partnerships, while members of Star Alliance have steadily increased them. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.1. Average number of code share agreements for aligned airlines (with any other airline in 
the top-150 of airlines) according to their GAL of enrollment.  
 
A fair comparison between GALs should also consider if entering airlines have the same number of 
partnerships as incumbent members, or if there are significant differences. Indeed, Table 3.3.1 
exhibits that by 2011 those airlines that had joined their GALs during the 2006-2011 period had 
partnerships with fewer airlines than the average for long-term members. The difference is 
particularly remarkable for SkyTeam, which shows significant differences in the number of code 
share agreements depending on the period of enrollment. Star Alliance and oneworld have more 
limited differences between incumbent and incoming airlines, but if we compare the second column 
in Table 3.3.1 with Figure 3.3.1 above, it can be noted that Star Alliance is the only GAL whose 
                                                             
41 By September 2011, Mexicana (oneworld) was still considered as a formal member, although it ceased 
operations in August 2010. From here on, when considering 2011 data, Mexicana is not included in the 
comparisons referring to oneworld members.  
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incoming airlines had by 2011 more code share agreements than the original GAL members in 
2006. Said that, by the end of this section a more complete study including other explanatory 
variables for the number of code share agreements of aligned airlines will shed light on the impact 
of time of enrollment on the network development through partnerships. As an example, Figure 
3.3.2 shows that (i) airline size, and (ii) GAL of enrollment might also have an impact on the number 
of code share agreements of an airline.  
 
Table 3.3.1. Number of partnerships in 2011 for incoming (2006-2011) and incumbent GAL members 
(2005 or before). 
 
New members in 
2006-2011 
Average partnerships per 
incoming member 
Average partnerships per 
incumbent member 
SkyTeam 6 11 18 
Star Alliance 7 18 21 
oneworld 4 12 15 
 
 
Figure 3.3.2. Number of partnerships (code share agreements) compared to revenue for each member 
airline in 2011. 
 
The weight of each GAL on the partnership strategy of its members can be seen more closely by 
analyzing the reliance of aligned airlines in their global alliance for the development of code share 
agreements. If airlines rely extensively on their GAL partners it may indicate either an exclusivity 
agreement within the GAL, a higher advantage in partnering with GAL partners, or that the 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
100 1,000 10,000 100,000N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
p
a
rt
n
e
rs
h
ip
s 
p
e
r 
a
ir
li
n
e
2010 Anual Revenue (log scale)
Number of partnerships per aligned airline
ON
ST
SK
 73  
international network of the alliance members is in consonance with the network reach of their 
GAL.  
In Figure 3.3.3 it can be observed that an average Star Alliance member had between 65% and 78% 
of their code share agreements—among top-150 world airlines—with other Star Alliance members 
between 2006 and 2011. In that same period, oneworld fell between 21 and 29 points behind, while 
by 2011 SkyTeam had closed the gap with Star Alliance to 18 points. Oneworld had a fairly stable 
trend in the period 2007-2011. In fact, the proportion of agreements within oneworld could not be 
increased as the alliance had always between 10 and 11 operative alliance members in the 2007-
2011 period, and oneworld members might have had to continue relying on airlines out of the 
alliance for developing an international network. Between 2006 and 2009, SkyTeam showed 
similar values to oneworld. In fact, it was not only until 2010 and 2011 when SkyTeam members 
could leverage the larger size of their alliance (14 members by September 2011) to increase the 
proportion of intra-alliance partnership. The tentative relationship between the number of airline 
members and the proportion of code share agreements within an airline’s own GAL is challenged in 
Figure 3.3.4. The series 2006-2011 for the three GALs deliver a positive lineal relationship with 
R2=0.78. 
 
 
 Figure 3.3.3. Proportion of code share agreements with airlines of the same GAL by the unweight 
average of the proportion of the GAL members in a given year. 
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Figure 3.3.4. Reliance on global alliance partners for code share agreements. 
 
The use of GALs by its members can be also analyzed from an opposite perspective, i.e. by the 
degree of use of all the code sharing relationships available within the GAL. Figure 3.3.5 exhibits the 
average percentage of members to which GAL members were connected in the 2006-2011 period. 
Not surprisingly, oneworld, with fewer members, had realized the highest proportion of all possible 
intra-GAL partnerships; however, this ratio decreased from 77% in 2008 to 69% in 2011, due to the 
arrival of Mexicana in 2009 amid financial problems and few code share agreements with oneworld 
members. Star Alliance shows an upward trend despite its significant size increase, which could 
have driven the alliance members to have code share agreements with a fewer percentage of total 
members. Then, this growth may be an implicit proof of a solid integration of incoming members. 
SkyTeam shows ups and downs during the period of analysis but, although by 2011 an average 
SkyTeam member has code sharing relationships with two thirds of its partners, there has been no 
improvement in this indicator during the period 2006-2011 despite maintaining a constant number 
of GAL members.42 
 
                                                             
42 Our mention to “constant number of GAL members” considers that by the beginning of September 2011, 
when annual data was available, SkyTeam only had 14 official members, the same as by 2008. By the end of 
September 2011, China Airlines would join as the 15th member. 
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Figure 3.3.5. Average proportion of GAL partners to whom aligned airlines in each of the GALs in a 
given year are partnered with (i.e. they have code share agreements). 
 
Our emphasis on the code share partnerships between GAL partners, differentiating them from the 
rest of code share agreements, is justified by some indicators associating partnerships between 
airline of the same GAL with a more intense and more durable partnership. As it is discussed below, 
agreements with GAL partners involve more code sharing routes, and during 2006-2011 the 
number of broken agreements between alliance partners has been very limited. 
Using Airline Business’ terminology, code share agreements reported in AB’s annual reports on 
alliances are classified as either “limited” when agreements involve code sharing on fewer than 10 
routes, or “comprehensive” when there are 10 or more routes involved in the partnership. Table 
3.3.2 shows that for all three GALs, the percentage of “comprehensive” agreements is significantly 
larger for intra-GAL agreements than for the rest of code share agreements. However, the 
difference between these two groups of partnerships has been reduced during 2006-2011.  
The converging trend in Table 3.3.2 can be explained by two reasons. First, new entrants in GALs 
have a shorter network reach than previous GAL members, and, hence, they are bringing more 
limited agreements. Second, aligned airlines have eliminated more agreements with non-partner 
airlines when the extent of the agreement was limited, and, hence, this could be replaced by GAL 
partners, hence raising the proportion of comprehensive code share agreements over the total 
number of agreements with non-GAL partners. In a comparison of the three GALs, SkyTeam and 
oneworld show a much smaller difference than Star Alliance, whose intra-alliance partnerships are 
still of a “comprehensive” reach for 46% of the total of intra-alliance partnerships. 
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Table 3.3.2. Percentage of comprehensive agreements for GAL members. 
 Proportion of Comprehensive code share agreements out of total agreements with GAL partners (%).43 
Proportion of Comprehensive code share agreements out of total agreements with non-GAL airlines (%). 
 Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SkyTeam 
55% 34% 32% 39% 29% 30% 
9% 13% 10% 11% 15% 19% 
Difference 46% 21% 22% 28% 14% 11% 
Star Alliance 
56% 54% 52% 49% 47% 46% 
6% 10% 11% 13% 24% 27% 
Difference 50% 44% 39% 36% 23% 19% 
oneworld 
52% 32% 31% 28% 35% 31% 
14% 17% 19% 21% 20% 24% 
Difference 38% 15% 12% 7% 15% 8% 
 
An analysis of broken code share agreements shows that agreements between GAL partners are 
significantly less prone to be broken than when they involve non-GAL partners. During the period 
2006-2011, and considering AB’s data base of the largest airlines in the world, 579 new code share 
agreements and 242 broken code shares could be counted.44 From these 242 broken code shares, 
only 24% of them corresponded to intra-GAL agreements, although the majority of agreements for 
aligned airlines are with their GAL partners (47% for oneworld members, 51% for SkyTeam 
members, and 73% at Star Alliance members), as shown before in Figure 3.3.3. The results are 
shown in Table 3.3.3, which considers the average airline at each GAL. Star Alliance members show 
the most remarkable differentiation between the alignment of the partner and the breaking 
likelihood of the partnership, as intra-GAL agreements are significantly more unlikely to be broken. 
 
Table 3.3.3. Proportion of broken code share agreements in intra-GAL partnerships. 
Global Airline 
Alliance 
A 
Percentage of partnerships 
between members of the 
same GAL (averaged during 
the 2006-2011 period) 
B 
Percentage of broken 
alliances during 2006-2011 
period corresponding to 
intra-GAL partnerships 
Ratio A/B 
Meaning: 0= no broken code shares in 
intra-GAL agreements; 
1=equal number of broken code shares 
among the two types of partnerships 
SkyTeam 51% 32% 0.63 
Star Alliance 73% 24% 0.33 
oneworld 47% 28% 0.60 
 
                                                             
43 Comprehensive agreements, as defined by Airline Business, take place when they involve 10 or more code 
sharing routes between the two partner alliances 
44 These values are duplicated. E.g. an alliance between Air France and Delta Airlines is counted for both Air 
France and for Delta Airlines records. 
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Next, a closer view of the reasons for broken bilateral code share agreements between airlines of 
the same GAL reveals that from the 40 broken bilateral partnerships in Star Alliance, SkyTeam, and 
oneworld together, only in 25% of them (10) the breakage could not be justified by having a 
partner in one of the following exceptional cases: i) ceasing commercial operations, ii) exiting the 
original global airline alliance, or iii) merging with another airline and disappearing as an airline 
brand. Figure 3.3.6 breaks the weights of all the different sources down, and Table 3.3.4 
summarizes the specific reasons of the 30 justifiable broken partnerships.  
 
 
Figure 3.3.6. Broken code share agreement in the three GALs during the 2006-2011 period. 
 
 
Table 3.3.4. Exceptional reasons for broken code share agreements between GAL partners during the 
period 2006-2011. 
 
So far, in this analysis we have always considered an average member when comparing GALs. The 
differences between members of the same GAL, however, are significant; for example, the size of 
two partner airlines, when compared by annual revenues, may differ by a factor of over 100. 
Although this limits the implications of our analysis to generalize from one GAL to all its members, 
the distribution of airlines by size is fairly similar among the three GALs, validating the comparison 
Ceased 
operations
37%
Exit from the 
GAL
28%
Merger
10%
Other
25%
Reasons for broken code share agreements between GAL 
partners
Total: 40 (100%)
Reason Number of broken partnerships 
Varig (oneworld) ceased operations 10 
Continental Airlines leaves SkyTeam due to a merger with United 
Airlines from Star Alliance 
7 
Northwest Airlines merges with Delta Airlines (SkyTeam) 4 
Mexicana ceased operations (oneworld) 5 
Shanghai Airlines leaves Star Alliance breaking partnerships with 
Star Alliance members 
4 
Total 30 
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between alliances. Figure 3.3.7 summarizes these two characteristics—similarity between GALs, 
and the differences between alliance members—with a distribution of aligned airlines by the 
number of code share agreements recorded in Airline Business’ database by September 2011. Only 
a few of the largest airlines —British Airways in oneworld, Lufthansa in Star Alliance, and Air 
France and KLM in SkyTeam- had partnerships with over 90% of its alliance partners. This 
contrasts with the lower percentage of possible intra-GAL partnerships realized by Adria Airways 
(Star Alliance) with 23% (6) of them, S7 Airlines (oneworld) with 30% (4), or Tarom (SkyTeam) 
with 38% (5). The median value in each GAL varies significantly between a 70% for oneworld, 65% 
for SkyTeam, and 54% for Star Alliance. The difference here is that Star Alliance’s small and middle 
size carriers connect with a smaller portion of the rest of their GAL partners, despite having more 
partnerships in absolute terms. Only Lufthansa, Swiss, and bmi, have partnerships with more than 
80% of the rest of Star Alliance members, compared to 4 airlines at SkyTeam and 5 airlines at 
oneworld over this 80% threshold.  
 
  
Figure 3.3.7. Distribution of airlines for each of the three GALs according to the proportion of 
members of the same GAL to whom they were partnered (code share agreement) in 2011. 
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Code sharing routes  
Up to this point in this section, we have focused on the code share agreements between airlines as 
the unit of measure when considering aligned airlines’ network development. A more detailed view, 
however, should refer to the amount of code share routes in vigor. Here we construct a linear 
regression model to understand the explanatory variables for the volume of code share routes of 
each airline. For that purpose, we use the list of code share routes compiled by airlineroute in 2011. 
This document reports 16,000 routes and 1,600 bilateral partnerships in vigor for 202 of the 
largest airlines in the world, including duplication from double-counting. This data base was loaded 
in the GDS by August 8, 2011, and given the nature of this distribution channel, many of the largest 
low-cost carriers are self-excluded. Our focus here is on the volume of code share routes of the 
aligned carriers, as well as other network carriers in negotiations for enrollment. The idea is to 
aggregate the total number of code share routes of a given airline with any of the top-150 largest 
airlines in the world, and then, to find the variables that can explain this volume of code shares. The 
values of this consolidated indicator vary from the over 800 code shares routes of United Airlines to 
the 12 code share routes of Garuda Indonesia.  
A limitation of the airlineroute data base is that it does not consider some of the codeshare 
agreements reported in the Airline Business data base. Our criterion has been to consider only the 
airlines for which 85% or more of their code shares agreements reported by Airline Business are 
also counted by the airlineroute data base. The list of considered airlines (34) is shown in Table 
3.3.5 including their 2010 revenue, which as a proxy variable for airline size proved to be the best 
single indicator for the number of code share routes of each airline, as it can be already inferred 
from Figure 3.3.6. A posterior analysis considering all the aligned airlines initially evaluated (57) 
brings to similar conclusions than with this subgroup. 
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Table 3.3.5. Sample of network airlines considered in the regression model. 
Airline Alliance 
Revenue 
2010 ($m) 
Code share 
routes 
Airline Alliance 
Revenue 
2010 ($m) 
Code share 
routes 
American  oneworld  22,170 428 
 
    
British Airways "  13,168  443 
 
TAM Star Alliance 6,475 129 
Cathay Pacific "  11,523  119 
 
TAP Portugal " 2,932 309 
Iberia "  6,361 405 
 
Thai " 5,822 153 
Qantas "  12,145 116 
 
United  " 31,547 810 
Air Berlin 
oneworld 
(2012) 
 4,915  147 
 
US Airways " 11,908 503 
Aegean  
Star 
Alliance 
 780 51 
 
Air India unaligned45 3,000 42 
Air Canada "  10,428 570 
 
Aeromexico SkyTeam 2,220 112 
Air China "  12,203 286 
 
Air Europa " 1,583 57 
ANA "  15,963 343 
 
Air France " 19,454 496 
Asiana Airlines "  4,377 127 
 
Alitalia " 4,224 395 
Brussels 
Airlines 
"  1,228 219 
 
China 
Eastern  
" 11,089 90 
Continental  "  14,880 590 
 
Delta  " 31,755 454 
Lufthansa "  19,800 675 
 
Kenya 
Airlines 
" 1,066 64 
SAS "  5,978 326 
 
Korean Air " 9,923 197 
Singapore 
Airlines 
"  10,957 120 
 
Vietnam 
Airlines 
" 1,876 44 
South African 
Airways 
"  2,900 163 
 
Garuda 
Indonesia 
SkyTeam 
(2012) 
2,027 12 
Spanair "  800 131 
 
    
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.8. Relation between the number of code share routes for a given airline with world top-150 
carriers, as reported by airlineroute in August 2010, and the 2010 annual revenue of the airline, as 
reported by Airline Business.  
 
                                                             
45 Air India was in process to join Star Alliance until July 2011, when its application was suspended (Star 
Alliance, 2011b). 
R² = 0.5021
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The Regression Model 
In order to comprehend the factors determining the use of code share, several tentative explanatory 
variables have been tested in a linear regression model. The candidate variables have been included 
to account for some of the potential characteristics of an airline that make it more (less) prone to 
have code share routes in its network. Following, the tested variables are defined in Table 3.3.6. 
  
Table 3.3.6. List of independent variables considered as tentative regressors (xi) in the linear 
regression model for the number of code share routes (Y) of a network carrier. 
 
REVENUE 
 
The airline annual revenue in USD millions for 2010 is used as a proxy for airline 
size. By late 2011, the 2010 data was the last year of full data available, as 
compiled by Airline Business (Airline Business, 2011). When the revenue data 
was consolidated for a multi-brand airline group (IAG, United-Continental, 
Lufthansa AG, Air France-KLM), the revenue for each one of the brands was 
estimated by prorating the revenues of the airline brand through its portion of 
RPKs out of the total RPKs of the airline group. 
RPK 
 
The airline annual revenue passenger-kilometers in 2010 of each airline in 
millions, also used a as a proxy for airline size. The high correlation with 
REVENUE (>0.90) brings to include either RPK or REVENUE as an explanatory 
variable and to exclude the other one. 
EUROPEAN Dummy variable [0,1]. Its value is 1 when the airline is based in a European 
country, including Turkish and Russian carriers. It is 0 otherwise. 
EU.LEGACY Same variable as EUROPEAN, but restricted for the historical flag carriers of each 
European country. 
EU.REGIONAL 
 
Save variable as EUROPEAN, but restricted to the European carriers without a 
significant number of routes to North America or Asia. Considering the airlines 
shown in Table 3.3.5, this category would correspond to Aegean Airlines, Air 
Europa, Brussels Airlines, Spanair, and TAP Portugal. 
US&CANADA Dummy variable [0,1]. Its value is 1 when the airline is either one of the allied US 
carriers or Air Canada. 
N.ATLANTIC Same variable as US&CANADA, but including also all European carriers, i.e. 
airlines with EUROPEAN=1. 
STAR, ONEWORLD,  
SKY, SKY+ONEWORLD 
Dummy variables [0,1]. Their value is 1 for airlines enrolled in the GALs 
described by each particular variable. 
EARLY Dummy variable [0,1]. Its value is 1 for those airlines that aligned during the 
1997-2001 period, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Results of the Model 
All the variables presented in Table 3.3.6 were calculated for every observation of the analysis. 
Standard Least Squares (SLS) estimation was applied to the model in order to estimate its 
coefficients. Table 3.3.7 shows the result of the best-fit model with the largest number of tentative 
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explanatory variables while avoiding correlation issues between them. A refined version of this 
model, including only the statistically significant variables is shown thereafter in Table 3.3.8. 
 
Table 3.3.7. Results from the SLS regression considering the maximum amount of uncorrelated 
variables. 
 
**Indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant with a 99% confidence. 
 
Table 3.3.8. Results from the SLS regression considering only the statistically significant variables. 
Refined linear regression model 
Term Coefficient t ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 6.5846 0.25 0.8048 
REVENUE 0.010666 5.18 <.0001** 
N.ATLANTIC 248.302 7.93 <.0001** 
STAR 125.543 4.53 <.0001** 
EU.REGIONAL -167.882 -3.54 0.0014** 
Adjusted R2 0.861 
52.1 
 
F-ratio  
Observations 34  
**Indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant with a 99% confidence. 
 
Similar interpretations can be excerpted from the basic and the refined linear regression models. 
Being in the North Atlantic market is the dummy variable with the highest weight, size (i.e. annual 
revenue) aside. This can be explained by the tight commercial relation between the US and the 
European Union, and also between EU countries, which is translated into a higher volume of code 
share routes between airlines from these countries than in any other intercontinental flow.46 In 
absence of the N.ATLANTIC variable, the EUROPEAN variable would also have a positive coefficient. 
This positive impact of being a carrier in the North America-European market is balanced, for some 
                                                             
46 Historically, the EU and the US have had the largest transcontinental trade flow in the world; for a brief 
review of this relation, see Cooper (2011).  
Basic linear regression model 
Term Coefficient t ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept -7.8879 -0.29 0.7771 
REVENUE 0.01074 4.81 <.0001** 
EU.LEGACY 68.132 1.88 0.071 
N.ATLANTIC 212.234 6.32 <.0001** 
EARLY 33.870 0.92 0.367 
STAR 121.089 4.16 0.0003** 
ONEWORLD -18.729 -0.44 0.6661 
EU.REGIONAL -161.973 -3.32 0.0026** 
Adjusted R2 0.888 
33.8 
 
F-ratio  
Observations 34  
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airlines, by the EU.REGIONAL variable. This dummy variable indicates that for those airlines 
without enough size to extend their network farther of their regional area in Europe, they are 
predicted to have fewer code shares of what corresponds to their size. Additionally, Star Alliance 
members (STAR) will have, on average, and all else equal, more code share routes than aligned 
airlines in oneworld and SkyTeam. A limitation of this analysis is that there are not enough 
unaligned carriers in the study group for analyzing the impact of being member of oneworld or 
SkyTeam on the number of code share routes. 
An analysis including the 57 carriers initially considered, i.e. obviating the need for validation of 
airlineroute with Airline Business data, would bring to similar conclusions. All the variables 
considered above would conserve their sign, although two more variables would be statistically 
significant while avoiding high variable correlations, EU.LEGACY (+) and US&CANADA(+). With six 
variables, the model would have adjusted R2=0.828, and F-ratio=45.9. Overall, this new model 
would have EU.LEGACY as the dummy variable with the highest weight (212.5). A limitation here is 
that a significant portion of the non-European legacy carriers have significantly fewer code share 
agreements acknowledged by airlineroute than by Airline Business, weighting their code share 
routes down in this comparison, and limiting the implications of this result. 
 
Code share partnerships 
A similar analysis can be conducted evaluating the code share agreements of aligned airlines.47 As 
shown previously in Figure 3.3.2, the number of agreements of an aligned airline tends to increase 
with airline’s size. Beginning with the same explanatory variables used before (see Table 3.3.6 
above), a linear regression model is conducted. Table 3.3.9 shows the best-fit model justifiable by 
statistically significant variables with at least a 90% confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
47 Aer Lingus is also considered as a former aligned carrier (oneworld). 
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Table 3.3.9. Results from the SLS regression for code share agreements. 
Linear regression model 
Term Coefficient t ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept -12.034 -2.45 0.0182* 
STAR 5.093 3.23 0.0023** 
EUROPEAN.STAR 3.638 1.72 0.0930 
LOG.REVENUE 7.205 5.42 <.0001** 
Adjusted R2 0.483 
16.4 
 
F-ratio  
Observations 50  
*(**) Indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant with a 95% (99%) confidence. 
Note: EUROPEAN.STAR corresponds to airlines that have a weight of 1 both under the EUROPEAN category 
and under STAR category. LOG.REVENUE is a continuous variable corresponding to the logarithmic 
transformation of the values of REVENUE for all observations considered.  
 
This regression models provides a much lower goodness of fit than the model on code share routes. 
One straightforward interpretation is that there are many other factors affecting the outcome that 
have not been captured by the proposed variables. Also, the weight of the REVENUE variable is 
more limited as the number of code sharing partners is not as conditioned by size as when 
considering code share routes, highly limited by network size. Additionally, the limited range of 
values of code share agreements—minimum of 6 agreements for Aer Lingus, maximum of 33 for 
Lufthansa—makes of the outcome variable coarser in its observation and, hence, more uncertain in 
its characterization. Notwithstanding this limitation, this regression model corroborates that being 
a Star Alliance member can explain a higher number of code share agreements, arguably even more 
in case of European members of Star Alliance.  
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
 
In the 1980s airlines began to form international code share agreements as a way to develop a 
multi-hub international network in which international carriers could feed traffic to each other 
from their domestic networks. Between 1989 and 2002, there were four attempts to develop multi-
lateral alliances spearheaded by Swissair that failed due to the absence of a large European carrier 
and a single, and committed, US partner. A fifth strategic alliance, between Northwest Airlines and 
KLM, would end up integrating into SkyTeam. Only when large carriers from the US, Europe, and 
Asia joined together—as in Star Alliance (1997), oneworld (1999), and SkyTeam (2000)—did the 
project of a global strategic alliance in the airline industry succeed.  
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Today, the three Global Airline Alliances (GALs) are multi-airline strategic alliances with presence 
in most countries. Together, they have attained half of the world capacity share and two-thirds of 
the international RPKs. Since their formation, the three GALS have continuously enrolled new 
members from all over the world. However, the North Atlantic continues to be the world region 
with their largest market share, both in intercontinental and intracontinental routes. They have 
their lowest presence in the Asia-Europe flow and within Africa. 
This chapter has analyzed the evolution of the GALs during the period 2006-2011 considering them 
as enhancers of code share agreements. We have observed that as the GALs increase in size, the 
proportion of agreements between GAL members increase. More relevantly, code share agreements 
between GAL partners are, on average, more than 60% less prone to be broken than code share 
agreements without a GAL partner. Additionally, up to 75% of the 40 broken partnerships between 
GAL members observed between 2006 and 2011 could be explained by exceptional situations, i.e. 
one of the carriers experiencing cease of operations, leaving the GAL, or disappearing as a brand 
due to a merger. 
The implications outlined above need to be tempered by the fact that large differences between 
members exist, and this also translates into their use of the GALs. In all three strategic alliances 
there are two or three airline groups that make up half of the RPKs of the GAL, and these airlines 
are the only ones code sharing with all GAL members. The enormous differences in size between 
members, in some cases well over 100 times, are not deterministically translated into large 
differences in the number of code share agreements of each airline. In fact, other variables 
explaining the differences in the number of code share agreements have been successfully tested 
here.  
The regression models developed have shown that airlines that are in the North Atlantic market, 
and, independently, Star Alliance members, have significantly more code share routes than the rest 
of aligned carriers, all else being equal. As part of the Star Alliance, members hold more code share 
agreements than in the case of carriers aligned with SkyTeam and oneworld. Overall, Star Alliance’s 
larger size serves its members as a more robust framework for adding code share agreements to 
expand their network of destinations. From observation of the 2006-2011 period, a similar 
implication can be extended to SkyTeam: we can observe a positive relationship between the 
enrollment of new airlines into the GAL and both the increase of the average number of code share 
agreements and the proportion of code share agreements with GAL partners. The smallest GAL, 
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oneworld, is characterized by the highest density of code share agreements between its members: 
by September 2011, its members had, on average, code sharing with 69% of their GAL partners.  
This chapter has focused on understanding the use of GALs as a framework for the development of 
code share agreements, which contribute to expanding the network of destinations of enrolled 
carriers. However, we have not considered the impact of GAL enrollment and code share 
agreements on the annual revenue or net income of a given carrier. Further research could evaluate 
the effect of GALs on the long-term profitability of carriers in order to assess the economic value-
added of strategic alliances in the airline industry. 
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Chapter 4: Policy Implications 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The air transport industry is highly regulated compared to other industries. In fact, the birth and 
growth of global alliances is closely tied to the regulatory frameworks and competitive issues in the 
countries where allied carriers are based. National governments have mostly prevented airlines 
from deeper forms of collaboration than global airline alliances by limiting the ownership and 
control of national carriers by foreigners and, sometimes, by restricting the international air 
transport. Although the regulatory environment is in constant evolution, the understanding of the 
current drivers in the competitive assessment of airline alliances helps to explain the trends in 
global airline alliances and to predict its evolution. This chapter reviews the effects of collaborative 
schemes between airlines on consumers and competing unaligned airlines, as well as the current 
regulatory framework in the air transport industry from the perspective of global airline alliances.  
From a regulatory standpoint, there is an asymmetric environment in which while the industry 
develops as a global business common global rules for airline services fall short. However, during 
the last decades there has been a convergence between jurisdictions, initiated with the bilateral and 
multilateral agreements between countries. This process will be intensified as globalization 
develops, international commerce grows and global alliances expand.  
As a case of the greatest interest, our focus of study here will be in the United States and the 
European Union, which by large hold the most advanced international collaboration between 
countries. In addition, their markets are very representative of the airline industry, as together they 
account for a 60% of the world traffic in RPK terms. Also, the transatlantic market, i.e. the Europe-
North America flow, represents a 9% of the total traffic in the world, being the most intensive 
intercontinental commercial flow in the world, and the third total largest, after the EU-intra and US 
domestic markets.48 The transatlantic routes are also where global alliances initiated, and, as well, 
they have been the main focus of attention of researchers in the analysis of the effects of alliances 
on consumers’ welfare.  
In the recent history, the provisional application in March 2008 of the EU-U.S. Air Transport 
Agreement was a milestone in the increasingly closer collaboration between the regulation 
                                                             
48 From Boeing (2011). 
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frameworks of both jurisdictions. This agreement was followed by its second-stage in 2010. At the 
time of this thesis all efforts were concentrated on a final agreement that would even include lifting 
some ownership and control restrictions (see previous Section 2.2), although this had a very 
uncertain final deadline. A main driver in the process is the convergence between the competition 
laws at both sides of the Atlantic as regulators face similar challenges with respect to global 
alliances. 
This chapter provides an overview the similarities and differences between both systems (Section 
4.4), as well as the trends that can shape the global alliances in the future in this region in the world 
(Section 4.5). Before that, we introduce the benefits and drawbacks of alliances for consumers as 
well as some potential anti-competitive measures on competing airlines, with the intention of 
improving the understanding of the motivations of policy-makers at both sides of the Atlantic in 
their declared commitment of protecting the customers (European Union) and the public interest 
(United States). In Section 4.2 we review the economic theory on the potential benefits of alliances 
as well as the empirical evidence, when available, of its impact on prices, traffic flows, service 
quality, and competition. In Section 4.3 we provide a brief overview of possible anticompetitive 
effects of airline alliances on other carriers. This review may improve the understanding on the 
actions taken by regulators in the EU (European Commission) and the US (Department of 
Transportation—DOT) in their declared commitment of protecting “customers” and “public 
interest”, respectively. 
 
4.2 Impact on consumers 
 
The formation of international airline alliances implies the expansion of the hub-and-spoke 
networks, frequent flier programs and computerized reservation systems to a competitive scenario 
of collaboration between airlines. From a customer perspective, alliances have a positive impact on 
connecting passengers by coordinating flight schedules within an alliance, improving the 
convenience of connections at airports decreasing connecting times between gates and lowering 
transfer times for checked luggage, and unifying frequent flyer programs.  
Similarly, airlines can reduce their unit costs exploiting economies of traffic density, scale, and 
scope. These cost reductions can either be transmitted to final consumers on a given route or, 
alternatively, airlines could benefit from cooperative pricing on (part of) the routes of their shared 
network. The collaboration in price-setting is only allowed when regulators concede antitrust 
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immunity (ATI) to airlines in the provision of their join transport services, although airlines may 
also find subtle ways to coordinate fares.  
The classic economic theories distinguish between two types of alliances when a pair of airlines 
alliance in a particular city-pair market. A parallel alliance is when both airlines are operating in 
that market prior to the alliance, and complementary alliances, when the two airlines are combining 
their network to jointly provide a service for connecting passengers. Figure 4.2.1 illustrates a model 
of a complimentary alliance in which two airlines serve a new market AB when they combine their 
routes; Figure 4.2.2 shows the international route that is operated in parallel by two allied airlines. 
In reality, a partnering between two airlines—and their networks—implies a combination of both 
types of alliances, as captured in Figure 4.2.2. In any case, each market can be reduced to either one 
type on other, and this translates to different effects on consumers’ welfare. In fact, according to the 
theoretical framework developed by Park (1997), Brueckner (1997), and Oum et al. (2000) parallel 
and complementary alliances can imply different competitive outcomes, as follows. 
In complementary alliances the cooperation between airlines increases the frequency of flights 
connecting city pairs AC, AD, BC, and BD (see Figure 4.2.2); hence, potential passengers decrease 
their schedule delay cost which translates in increasing demand, i.e. traffic of passengers. A higher 
demand brings to higher loader factors on both legs AH and BH or, alternatively, the provision of 
more flights on AH and/or BH to cope with the increased demand, which also results in higher 
frequencies between international city pairs. In both cases, the partner airlines have increasing 
returns to traffic density from larger demand, which translates in reduced operating costs per 
passenger.  
 
 
Figure 4.2.1. Hub-and-spoke networks for Airlines 1 and 2, Country 1 and Country 2 (Brueckner and 
Whalen, 2000). 
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Furthermore, in complementary alliances in which cooperative pricing is allowed, the economic 
theory developed by Park and Brueckner predicts that the fare on connecting itineraries, e.g. AC, 
decreases compared to a previous non-cooperative scenario. In the latter case, airlines would set a 
“sub-fare” for their portion of the interline itinerary, bringing to a local optima price for the flight 
leg they operate; the overall fare for the AC itinerary would be the sum of the sub-fares. When 
carriers are allied and can cooperate in pricing, which usually requires being under antitrust 
immunity, they cooperatively set the entire fare, instead of individual fares. Now, each airline takes 
account of the fact that an increase on its own subfare impacts negatively on the traffic of the other 
carrier.49 In fact, for maximizing joint profits on the route, airlines bring fares down.50 
In parallel alliances two allied carriers continue to provide service on a route before and after the 
alliance. This phenomenon is seen in the flow between hub-to-hub airports51, where airlines were 
already overlapping prior to the alliance. As airlines cooperate in the hub-to-hub market, they 
reduce the number of competitors on the non-stop service. According to the first studies of Park 
and Brueckner and a classic industrial organization perspective, higher fares are expected from a 
collusive behavior of airlines, as they maximize their combined profits. Oum et al. (2000) argued 
that the degree of overlap between the respective networks is usually a key determinant because 
the higher the overlap, the more severe are the competition concerns and the more likely are price 
increases as a consequence of cooperation.  
 
 
Figure 4.2.2. Hub-to-hub route. 
 
In fact, alliances in hub-to-hub markets have centered the concerns of regulators about potential 
anticompetitive effects. A potential remedy for particular hub-to-hub routes are “carve outs”, which 
consists on granting antitrust immunity in all markets excepting for the hub-to-hub market(s) of 
                                                             
49 This concept is referred as double marginalization; Brueckner (2001) provides a mathematical 
demonstration. 
50 See proof in Oum et al. (2000) and Brueckner & Whalen (2000). 
51 Also referred as international gateway city-pair markets. 
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concern, where carriers are prohibited from commonly pricing their products and services 
(Brueckner & Proost, 2009).52 
The empirical evidence, as reported in the literature, has supported the prediction of lower fares in 
complementary alliances, while no evidence has been found of significant increase in fares on hub-
to-hub routes after airlines ally. Brueckner (2003a, 2003b) reported up to a 27% reduction in 
interline fares from the combined effect of alliance membership, code sharing (8-17%), and 
antitrust immunity (13-21%) on international itineraries with three or more segments. Park & 
Zhang (2000) also found that complementary alliances led to lower fares in North Atlantic markets.  
On the other hand, findings on parallel alliances have found no statistically significant impact of 
alliance cooperation on fares in hub-to-hub markets (Brueckner and Whalen, 2000; Willig et al., 
2009, Zou et al., 2009). A different conclusion was found by Youssef & Hansen (1994), who 
reported increasing airfares in non-stop markets after the alliance between Swissair and SAS. On 
the other side, Wan et al. (2009), concluded that oneworld had lowered prices on its transpacific 
hub-to-hub routes, arguably because of the inability of American Airlines and British Airways to 
follow a price-setting strategy on their aligned routes53, and Oum et al. (2000) also found that the 
first parallel alliances of KLM-Northwest and Delta-Sabena-Swissair had decreased fares after the 
alliances although their market power had increased due to their efficiency gains.  
More recently, a divergent finding was brought by Gillespie & Richard (2011), who in a study of 
fares on non-stop trans-Atlantic flights during the period 2005-2010 showed that, all else equal, 
average one-way fares on routes with non-stop operators increased by about 7% for each reduction 
by one in the number of independent carriers serving the route. 
Other recent studies have challenged the conventional wisdom on the price effects of 
complementary alliances. As argued by Czerny (2009), airlines may use code share agreements to 
apply price discrimination between interline passengers and non-interline passengers, raising 
prices to interline passengers for the service provided. Brueckner et al. (2011) stated that the effect 
of antitrust immunity on economy-class tickets at trans-Atlantic connecting routes in the period 
1998-2009 was just between 0% and 1% reduction in fare. Similarly, Zou et al. (2011) found that 
                                                             
52 In 1996 United and Lufthansa were imposed carve-outs by the US DOT on the Chicago-Frankfurt and 
Washington-Frankfurt routes, which connect United and Lufthansa hubs. DOT also carved-out two non-stop 
overlaps in the Delta-Air France-Alittalia agreement in 2002 (Atlanta-Paris, Cincinnati-Paris) and four non-
stop overlaps when Continental joined the Star alliance in late 2009 (New York City to Stockholm, Lisbon, 
Geneva, and Copenhagen). 
53 By then, American Airlines and British Airways had no yet received antitrust immunity (ATI) from the US 
DOT. 
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the fare-reducing effects from optimal joint price-setting can be outweighed by the upward price 
pressure from airlines to capture passengers’ increasing willingness to pay for the code sharing 
service. Because of a better provided service, passengers are willing to pay higher airfares for allied 
airlines than for interline service.  
Overall, these results are not contradictory, but as Wan et al. (2009) proposes, they show that, after 
alliances are created, there are upward pressures on fares from the price-setting and the reduction 
in the number of competitors, but also downward pressures from efficiency gains in carriers’ 
operations. The effect on airfares depends on the balance between the upward and downward 
forces which can even upset each other (Zou et al., 2011). The final effect is conditioned by the 
pressure from airlines operating non-stop and pure-online flights in a particular market, as well as 
by the competition between alliances. 54,55  
 
4.3 Potential anticompetitive effects 
 
A greater integration of airlines may potentially defer the competition with existing and potential 
competitors. Given that, the analysis of anticompetitive effects also plays a main role in the analysis 
of the public impact of global alliances. The current focus of regulatory bodies on both sides of the 
Atlantic is on the approval or denial of clearance of antitrust immunity for alliance partners. 
Bilotkach & Hüschelrath (2011) consider three potential anticompetitive effects of airline 
coordination in their study of effects of antitrust immunity for airline alliances: potential for market 
foreclosure, potential for collusion, and the hindering of non-stop services. Considering the use of 
distribution channels made by GALs, Fernandez de la Torre (1999) pointed out the problematic of 
displaying the same itinerary in the computer reservation system (CRS) repeated times, once for 
each of the code sharing airlines, pushing down on the screen the O-D itinerary options of other 
competitors.  
Next, we identify four potential anticompetitive effects of airline alliances on independent carriers. 
Section 4.3.1 describes the problem of market foreclose, Section 4.3.2 brings the classical case of the 
                                                             
54 Pure online is when single carrier operates all the flights (two or more) on a given itinerary. 
55 Zou et al. (2011) conducted their study on itineraries between Northeast Asia and the United States in 
October 2007, finding that Star Alliance and SkyTeam tended to charge significantly higher fares for 
connecting itineraries than the sum of subfares, while oneworld members, with a smaller market share in the 
North trans-Pacific market had no significant higher airfares for their interline services. 
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potential problem of collusion between allies that is treated by antitrust regulation, Section 4.3.3 
briefly explains the barriers to entry for airlines operating non-stop services from/to connecting 
hubs, and Section 4.3.4 mentions a negative externality created by code sharing airlines to the rest 
of marketed carriers on distribution channels.  
 
4.3.1 Potential for market foreclosure 
 
Market foreclosure consists in the denial of access to competitors of inputs or consumers needed to 
compete in the market from the dominance position of the airlines enjoying antitrust immunity. 
This phenomenon can be represented through the model illustrated in Figure 4.3.1. The allied 
Airline 1 has an interline agreement with both a partner alliance, Airline 2, and a partner alliance, 
Airline 3 on the same leg. In theory, Airline 2 can lose market share without any increase in the 
interlining fee from Airline 1. In fact, the two allied firms Airline 1 and Airline 2, are allowed to 
coordinate price under antitrust immunity, and they can set a lower interlining fee that removes 
double marginalization. Consequently, this results in higher traffic between partner airlines with 
antitrust immunity and lower traffic by non-allied airlines on routes to/from hubs of partner 
alliances. The more resilient the connecting traffic carried by Airline 3 is, i.e. AC market, the higher 
the negative impact from foreclosure. In a more manifest way, foreclosure can also arise if Airline 1 
refuses to deal or rises interlining fees. 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1. Airline network with choice of alliance partner (Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, 2010). 
 
Alfred Kahn, “architect” of the Airline Deregulation Act, pointed out in one of his latest works that 
alliances might exacerbate the competitive disadvantages of incumbent unaligned carriers by 
increasing dominance in their hubs and opposing to interline with outsiders (Kahn, 2004). Market 
foreclosure is also characterized by Bilotkach & Hüschelrath (2011) in a scenario of competing 
global alliances with antitrust immunity: assuming each global alliance has control over one hub at 
each side of the Atlantic, the routes between hubs dominated by carriers from different alliances 
will have declining traffic, as each carrier has a limited market power in behind-gateway feeding 
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routes and both carriers have more problems to be profitable on the hub-to-hub segment. This 
phenomenon not only has an anticompetitive effect on the service between hubs from different 
alliances but, to a lesser degree, it also affects the spoke-to-spoke markets by limiting the routing 
options.56 In Figure 4.3.2 a simple network illustrates this: both the H2-H3 route served by the 
Alliance 1 and the H1-H4 served by Alliance 2 are affected by foreclosure, and the S1-H1-H4-S2 and 
S1-H2-H3-S2 routes may not be available anymore. However, overall the competition between 
alliances may increase in the spoke-to-spoke markets but in the affected markets there may also be 
decreasing competition, as non-alliance carriers may decrease flight frequency and switch to 
smaller aircraft on their services to immunized hubs.  
 
 
Figure 4.3.2. Simple airline network with two alliances (Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, 2010). 
 
4.3.2 Potential for collusion 
 
There is evidence in the literature that airlines refrain from initiating aggressive pricing actions on 
a given route fearing the reaction of competitors in other jointly contested routes. For instance, 
Evans & Kessides (1994) found that fares were higher in city-pair markets served by carriers with 
extensive network overlapping. Under antitrust immunity between allied airlines, collusion is 
allowed de facto within the alliance but, additionally, the extent of market contact between firms, 
which in this case refers to global alliances, increases with their growth in scope. As noted by 
Bilotkach & Hüschelrath (2011) there has not been emphasis on this phenomenon of collusion 
within global alliances, but in the future more attention may be paid to the potential negative 
effects of a potential triopoly of oneworld, SkyTeam, and Star Alliance.  
                                                             
56 At the time of this thesis airlines each of the three global alliances were granted antitrust immunity in the 
North Atlantic market after the last of the alliances, oneworld, had its application for antitrust immunity 
approved by the US Department of Transportation (DOT) on February 13, 2010.  
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A reduction from four or more competitors to just three competitors could still have an impact on 
prices, yet limited. Gillespie & Richard (2011) estimated the difference in fares in international non-
stop routes and they found that, else equal, the positive difference between average one-way fares 
on routes with three independent competitors with respect to routes with three competitors was 
$28.57 Similarly, the work of Borenstein (1992) in the US domestic market provided evidence that 
with three competitors in a market most of the downward pressures on airfares from competition 
were already completed, without significant impact on cases with additional competitors. Arguably, 
these findings might be transferred to a case with just three de facto international competitors, i.e. 
the three global airline alliances. If that extrapolation proved to be true, a scene with three non-
collusive actors in each O-D market could still provide competitive markets.  
 
4.3.3 Network development 
 
The impact of global alliances in network development is an expansion of the effects of the hub-
and-spoke network structure, in which more markets are served by connecting flights, expanding 
the network coverage compared to a point-to-point network, but also dissuading future non-stop 
services between those markets. Partner alliances join their hub-and-spoke networks and, under 
the same reasoning, this hinders entry of the member airlines with new non-stop services between 
the markets in the network, limiting future competence through non-stop services, as shown by 
Dunn (2007) and Bilotkach (2009). 
 
4.3.4 Multiple listing on distribution channels  
 
An additional disadvantage for competitors of global airline alliances is that the same code sharing 
route appears in the online travel agencies and computer reservation systems (CRS) on multiple 
occasions under the name of all the code sharing airlines for just a single flight or combination of 
flights being operated. In CRS the effect is to push down potential competitors from the first screen, 
from where most of the travel agency reservations are made (Oster & Pickrell, 1988). A similar 
                                                             
57 The model accounted for differences in mileage distance of the route, and route’s population potential.  
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advantage of multiple listing by code sharing airlines can be experienced in the websites of online 
travel agencies like Expedia, Orbitz, Travelocity, and others. 
 
4.4 Regulatory framework 
 
In a world in which airlines remain highly attached to their nationality, they are considered as a 
strategic industry by national governments, and firm ownership by foreigners is still limited, at the 
international level global alliances are similar to exceptional stateless entities. In fact, the vagueness 
in international law causes that any international alliance depends on two or more national 
jurisdictions. As a result, in the absence of proper coordination, conflicts or incoherencies can arise 
with the foreign jurisdiction decision which allows companies operating on the world scene to 
circumvent rules of competition and antitrust. 
In the North Atlantic market, the airline industry has assisted to a deeper coordination between the 
regulatory bodies in the EU (European Commission), and the United States (Department of 
Transportation (DOT) and Department of Justice (DOJ)). The US began to negotiate “open skies” 
agreements with other countries in 1992, and in 1995 the first agreements with European 
countries were initiated. The aim of DOT was to provide open entry, unrestricted capacity and 
frequency on all routes, air service between any point in the United States and any point in the 
partner country, no government restrictions of fares, and code-share and charter rights. It was not 
until 2003 that the EU established a common legal framework for the air transport relationship 
between all the Member States and the rest of the world, establishing equality between all EU 
carriers. In May 2004 the Commission obtained jurisdiction to investigate air transport services 
between EU and third countries.58 Following that, in March 2008 all bilateral agreements between 
EU countries and the US were replaced by the EU-US Air Transport Agreement. The implementation 
of the Agreement implied a single framework for regulatory cooperation, while it formalized the 
cooperation between the EU and the US on competition matters aiming to avoid conflicts in their 
resolutions in the transatlantic air transport service. Overall, the goal of the Agreement, to be 
                                                             
58 By Regulation 847/2004, Member State courts and national competition authorities retained control of the 
international commitments they assumed with third countries, although a system of notification by the 
Member States and Commission approval and the enforcement of the EU competition rules was established, 
as the necessary safeguard against discrimination between Community carriers(European Commission & US 
DOT, 2010; Lykotrafiti, 2011). 
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achieved in a multi-step process, is the restructuring of the industry to allow for efficient cross-
border cooperation (European Commission & US DOT, 2010; Lykotrafiti, 2011). 
The main obstacle to a deeper integration in the regulatory framework of the EU and US is the 
perpetuation of the regulatory barriers on ownership and control, which prohibits EU and U.S. 
carriers from merging, as well as the prevalence of domestic cabotage as a national privilege. The 
European solution is the concept of “Open Aviation Area” (OAA), the next phase in the Agreement. 
The OAA is intended to deliver market access in the form of full freedoms of the air to both parties. 
Both European and American airlines would be able to operate freely within an open aviation area, 
subject only to a body of common rules on operational safety, security, competition and 
environmental protection (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2007). At the time of the official adoption of a 
Protocol to Amend the 2007 EU-US Air Transport Agreement on 24 June 2010, there had not yet 
been relevant changes to bring to an OAA, with the notable exception of the US granting EU airlines 
to offer services between the US and non-EU countries.59  
Giving the existing restrictions limiting the freedom of carriers from the EU and US to merge, global 
alliances and immunized joint ventures (JVs) continue playing a leading role in transatlantic 
markets. Indeed, at the level of competition in the airline industry, the main area of discussion at 
both sides of the Atlantic is the granting or denial of antitrust immunity (ATI) to airlines that are 
either participating in an alliance or intending to forge an alliance. The increasing number of cases 
of alliance reviews has brought to several recent analyses and discussions of the approaches of the 
competition authorities in the EU and US (e.g. Lykotrafiti, 2011; European Commission & US DOT, 
2010; Gillespie & Richard, 2011; Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, 2011) on which we base this analysis of 
the general approach of regulators in the United States and the European Union on antitrust 
immunity for international airline alliances. Moreover, the current policy approaches of the 
authorities can be of value for predicting the assessments of potential future mergers, given that as 
argued by Bilotkach & Hüschelrath (2011), JVs with granted ATI and mergers affect consumer 
markets very similarly and they are considered virtually identical by regulators. 
In the United States, the antitrust immunity (ATI) requests from airlines are decided by the DOT, to 
which the U.S. Congress transferred jurisdictions from the DOJ in 1988.60,61 The DOT bases its 
                                                             
59 See Lykotrafiti, (2011) for an extended discussion of the impacts of OAA as well as the needs and legal 
implications of regulatory convergence and harmonization of US antitrust and EU competition law. 
60 The DOJ is only allowed to make recommendations. 
61 There is no corresponding authority for DOT or DOJ with regard to domestic alliances between U.S. 
carriers, and domestic alliances do not have antitrust immunity. 
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decision on a two-step analysis. First, the DOT approves the alliance agreement if they are “not 
adverse to the public interest”62, and it “shall disapprove… an agreement… that substantially 
reduces or eliminates competition”63 unless “the agreement [….] is necessary to meet a serious 
transportation need or to achieve important public benefits”, and if those benefits cannot be met by 
reasonably available alternatives that are materially less anticompetitive. Second, if the alliances 
agreements are approved, it is not DOT’s policy to confer ATI simply on the grounds that an 
agreement has been approved as pro-competitive. In fact, exemption from the antitrust laws is 
authorized only if the parties would not otherwise go forward without it, and DOT “decides it is 
required by the public interest”.64 According to the DOT, the “public interest” standard is applied on 
a case-by-case basis, trying to balance between the promotion of a competitive aviation system that 
facilitates commerce and the consumer benefit from enhanced service options and competition. 
Generally, the DOT has used the antitrust immunity as an incentive to persuade foreign countries to 
sign Open Skies agreements with the US. 
In the European Union, from May 2004 the Commission has jurisdiction to investigate air transport 
services between the EU and third countries. The decisions are taken at the College of 
Commissioners of the Commission, with groups the Commissioners in charge of EU policies, 
including competition, transport, energy, and environment. The Commission argues that although it 
only applies EU competition rules, i.e. Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), “each policy area is given due consideration” and decisions are consistent 
“across all areas of its competence” (European Commission & US DOT, 2010). According to Article 
101, all alliances agreements between airlines prevent, restrict or distort competition within the 
European market, excepting for those agreements that meet all the following criteria:65 (a) they 
help to improve the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress, 
(b) consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits, (c) the restrictions must be 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, and (d) the agreements must not afford the 
parties the possibility of eliminating competition in a substantial part of the products and services 
offered. From Article 102, the agreements that bring to abuse of dominant position that either 
excludes competitors from the market, or that allows the company to exploit on consumers its 
market power (e.g. excessive fares) are prohibited with no exception.  
                                                             
62 See 49 USC §§41308-09. 
63 See 49 USC § 41309(b)(1). 
64 See 49 USC § 41308(b). 
65 As considered in Article 101 (3) TFEU. 
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The DOT has generally favored the formation of international alliances, arguing that the public 
benefit from network efficiencies and the new competitive framework would offset the cooperation 
in price-setting and capacity. For example, by the end of the 1990s the DOT even justified the 
granting of ATI by the benefits of creating alliances that could compete between them, rather than 
against unaligned carriers. The expected negative anticompetitive effects of alliances with granted 
ATI in the more critical gateway-to-gateway markets has been counterweighted by the imposition 
of carve-outs on the routes of concern.  
Differently, the Commission has been characterized by a low number of decisions in its evaluation 
of alliances with only two final resolutions between 1994 and 2008. The approval conditions in the 
single transatlantic alliance subject to conditions (Lufthansa-SAS-United in 2002) and in the 
resolutions of intra-European alliances, differ from the US; instead of using carve-outs, the 
surrender and/or release of airport slots and ground facilities is enforced. Table 4.4.1 characterizes 
some of the main differences between the regulatory approaches in the US and EU, and Table 4.4.2 
summarizes the enforcement actions of the European Commission and the US DOT during the last 
two decades. 
 
Table 4.4.1. Investigation of international airline alliances 
Jurisdiction Period 
Total 
Applications 
Accepted 
(In the North 
Atlantic 
market) 
Disapproved 
% Approval 
over 
Applications 
Dismissed by 
airlines or obsolete 
during evaluation 
process 
Pending* 
US 
1992-
2009 
 
35 28 (16) 3 84% 2 2 
EU 
1994-
2008 
11 2 (2) 0** 18% 3 4 
Source: Bilotkach & Hüschelrath (2011). 
*By May 2010 
**Two applications became inactive due to DOT's previous suspension 
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Table 4.4.2. Differences in regulatory approaches in the transatlantic market. 
Concept 
Jurisdiction 
United States European Union 
 
Consideration of 
airline alliances in 
the competition 
regime 
 
Exceptional 
Although DOJ is responsible for 
enforcing antitrust law in all industries, 
DOT can grant ATI to airline alliances 
 
 
Alignment with EU competition law, 
although considered to have the same 
competitive effects as mergers 
Mandates of the 
competition 
authority 
DOT is limited to transport industry, 
but also holds mandate on regulation 
and policy making 
 
It is the same authority across all 
industries 
Goal in the 
assessment 
Do the best for the "public interest" Ensure consumers are not harmed 
 
 
Methodology in the 
assessment of 
alliances 
Review of ATI applications before the 
alliance is implemented 
Commission reviews are ex post facto 
Airlines must assess the legality of their 
cooperation in accord with EU 
competition rules 
 
Transparency of 
assessment process 
Evidence and application materials are 
made available by DOT to the public 
Procedures are not public. 
The Commission publishes non-
confidential versions of its decisions and 
press-releases on its proceedings 
 
Considered market 
scope 
At three levels: network, country-pair, 
city-pair 
Focus on the network level 
 
At three levels: network, country-pair, 
city-pair 
Focus on the city-pair level 
Evaluation of 
consumer benefits 
DOT analyses them to justify the 
convenience of alliances and making a 
grant of ATI 
Commission focus only on negative 
competitive effects. 
The airlines have to argue the potential 
consumer benefits if ATI was granted 
 
Conditions and 
remedies to accept 
alliances and/or 
antitrust 
(i)Carve-outs on specific fares & routes 
(ii) Origin & destination survey data 
reporting requirement 
(iii) Yearly reporting requirements 
from the alliance members 
(i) Restrictions on frequencies 
/capacity/slots on specific 
routes/airports 
(ii) Requirements on blocked space 
agreements with new entrants and 
land transport companies 
(multimodal enforcement) 
Sources: European Commission & US DOT (2010), Bilotkach & Hüschelrath (2011).  
 
The differences between the approaches of the Commission and the European Union are 
representative of their view of global alliances. The Commission does not give a preferential 
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treatment to alliances and imposes more strict conditions to ensure that competition is not 
distorted; while the DOT, on the other hand, tends to be more relaxed concerning the conditions to 
be fulfilled, it is more reluctant to interfere with the business rationale through the imposition of 
conditions, and also considers the potential efficiencies in case alliances are allowed and/or airlines 
are granted with antitrust immunity. 
 
4.5 Prospects and challenges 
 
The current efforts in reaching a final EU-US Air Transport Agreement (ATA) seem directed toward 
the future development of an Open Aviation Area (OAA) that could reshape the industry. The 
creation of a single market in the EU and the US without ownership and control limitations would 
indeed allow transatlantic mergers. Further consolidation would be an opportunity for exploiting 
additional theoretical efficiencies and cost saving synergies over those delivered by alliances by 
maximizing cooperation between merging airlines. Assuming the implementation of a purely 
homogenous OAA, two questions arise regarding the future of global airline alliances: i) Would 
airlines opt for transatlantic mergers to the detriment of global airline alliances?, ii) Will the 
continued evolution of global airline alliances be aligned with the public interest?  
 
(i) Would airlines opt for transatlantic mergers to the detriment of global airline 
alliances? 
A reinterpretation of the industry changes after the 1978 Airline Deregulation in the US and the 
multi-step EU liberalization in the period 1987-1997 might provide reasonable answers to the 
question of how likely is that airlines choose to merge if there were an OAA and, in that case, if this 
closer collaboration scheme would replace the GALs. The more recent case of the EU shows a 
competitive scenario in which, 15 years later, the full implementation of a single market has 
brought the consolidation of carriers into three big network legacy firms that concentrate most of 
the market share within the “full-service” niche. However, along this path there have also occurred 
less expected events. One is that the emerging carriers have taken the shape of multi-brand airline 
groups with notable hub dualities, which acknowledges the difficulties in consolidating “flag 
carriers” considered as strong national brands. The second one is that, as of today, low-cost carriers 
capture more than one-third of the intra-Europe traffic.  
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Currently, we observe that the competitive pressure from LCCs could indirectly reinforce 
concentration among full service carriers, as some of the European “full service” network carriers 
with insufficient economies of size struggle to remain competitive. In fact, amid the economic 
downturn in the region, two GAL members ceased operations in 2012: Spanair (Star Alliance; 
Spain) and Malev (oneworld; Hungary). If more regional alliance members were to exit the market, 
the concentration of power within each GAL into a single multi-brand group would be reinforced.  
The record of European consolidation, represented in Table 4.5.1, and supported on the other side 
of the Atlantic by the prevalence of three large network legacy carriers in the US (United-
Continental, Delta Airlines, and American Airlines) with a 72% revenue market share in the US 
(Swelbar, 2011), could be examples of the future trends in a single OAA. Still, there are relevant 
characteristics of the transatlantic market that could preclude a similar consolidation. Overall, 
considering the record of mergers and acquisitions within the European Union, it seems plausible 
that even if there were to be transatlantic consolidation within a future OAA, the resulting company 
would be more likely to emerge in the form of a multi-brand airline, as this would prevent the 
disappearance of either US or European well-established brands. 
 
Table 4.5.1. Top-10 largest airline groups in Europe 
Ranking 
2010 
Group/Airline 
Revenues 
($m)† 
Revenue-size compared to 
Lufthansa Group (100) 
Global Airline 
Alliance 
1 Lufthansa Group 36,067 100 Star Alliance 
2 Air France-KLM 31,755 88 SkyTeam 
3 IAG 19,533 54 oneworld 
4 SAS Group 5,978 17 Star Alliance 
5 Air Berlin 4,915 14 oneworld 
6 Ryanair 4,807 13 - 
7 easyJet 4,632 13 - 
8 Alitalia 4,224 12 SkyTeam 
9 Virgin Group 4,000 11 - 
10 TAP Portugal 2,932 8 Star Alliance 
†Source: Airline Business (2011a). 
 
The strategic interest of transatlantic mergers might be limited if we consider the limited growth 
opportunities in the North America- Europe traffic flow. Indeed, there are symptoms of maturity as 
the transatlantic market shows the lowest estimated traffic growth among the largest international 
flows in the world: according to ICAO, the transatlantic flow would have 2.6% annual growth in the 
 103  
period 2010-2030 compared to the world average estimated between 3.7% and 5.2%.66 In addition, 
of all large traffic flows in the world, GALs already hold their largest market share of the North 
Atlantic flow, with around a 90% of all traffic. Still, according to ICAO forecasts, by 2030 5.7% of 
world traffic (in RPK terms) will be the in North America-Europe flow, compared to a 15% share for 
the domestic North America market, and a 7.4% share for the intra-Europe market. Overall, and 
considering also the high degree of collaboration already achievable when antitrust immunity is 
granted, the opportunities of revenue growth for aligned carriers through a transatlantic merger 
might not be attractive enough to initiate the usually challenging and disrupting merging process. 
On the side of cost efficiencies, however, the financial economies from further collaboration 
between carriers could provide merging firms with a competitive edge to support their profits in 
periods of economic downturn. Indeed, this is a reason strong enough for not disregarding cross-
border capital investments. On the other hand, political barriers and service costs of a geographical 
and cultural nature between EU and US firms could raise more impediments to a unified 
management structure than in the previous merging experiences within Europe, which already 
proved to be complex.  
At a larger scale, the liberalized framework allowed in the EU-US Air Transport Agreement is an 
exception within the global airline industry. According to ICAO forecasts until 2030, these other 
international and intercontinental flows will be characterized by a much larger expected traffic 
growth, e.g. 9% in Europe-Africa, 7.8% in Europe-China, 5% in North America-Latin America. This 
higher growth is projected despite the general persistence of barriers to foreign investment in most 
of these countries. Overall, the combination of high growth in international flows and the 
persistence of regulatory barriers to foreign carriers seem ideal to both global airline alliances and 
the Gulf carriers’ complementary model of a global connecting hub. 
 
(ii) Will global airline alliances be aligned in the future with the public interest? 
More than a decade after the GALs were formed, most of the literature published on the impact of 
global airline alliances has focused on airfares in the US domestic and transatlantic markets. 
Recently, the attention has been on the most cooperative agreements existing in the North Atlantic: 
                                                             
66 Estimates by Boeing “Current market Outlook 2011-2030” consider instead that annual traffic growth in 
the North Atlantic flow (3.6%) will be significantly larger than within North America (2.3%) and closely 
below the intra-Europe market (4.0%). These are the markets with lower expected growth in the world 
among the 14 large regions considered in Boeing’s analysis. 
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joint ventures with granted antitrust immunity (ATI), which fairly represent the case of merger-like 
associations. As of today, the literature on price effects of alliances on consumer’s benefit—with 
and without ATI on transatlantic routes—is, as shown in Section 4.2, still inconclusive. The 
remedies proposed by the EU Commission (slot divestment) and the US Department of 
Transportation (carve-outs) in case of potential anticompetitive practices attempt to avoid the 
dominance of GAL members at their hubs. These measures find the obvious resistance of allied 
airlines, who claim that the divestment implies the loss of a very valuable long-term asset, and the 
carve-out brings inefficiencies and extra-costs in their operations.  
A comprehensive assessment of the impact of global airline alliances requires that, in addition to 
airlines and consumers, more stakeholders with relevant weight in the decision-making process are 
considered. At the regional level, city authorities have serious interests in having one (or more) 
local airport(s) from which the city is served with an extensive network of destinations, high flight 
frequencies, low airfares, and that this contributes to generate business and jobs. Depending on the 
power distribution of the airport ownership and management bodies and the status of the airport 
as (non-) hub for one or more airlines, the objectives of the airport authority might be more or less 
well aligned with the interests of allied airlines. Labor unions, aircraft manufacturers, other 
suppliers, and large local corporations are also important stakeholders that can fall under the 
category of public interest. Political forces have a central role, not only through the granting of 
antitrust immunity, the development of international agreements or the enforcement of 
transportation and infrastructure policies but, given the importance of the airline industry as an 
economic and social enabler, some political actors might have their own agenda regarding alliances 
with implications that go beyond the scope of transport economics. 
From the perspective of consumers of air transport services, demand is mainly stimulated by low 
airfares and short total trip times.67 A third element in the election of airline is the quality of service 
provided by the each carrier. As introduced in Section 2.3.3, alliance members have focused on 
serving consumers with high frequency—through a multi-hub-to-spoke network—and on 
providing a superior quality of service than LCCs in connecting flights. By facilitating these 
purposes, global airline alliances are a crucial tool for network legacy carriers. Especially for price-
inelastic, business-class travelers, for whom low displacement time and high quality of service have 
more importance than for tourist-class passengers, the “seamless” network provided by GALs could 
                                                             
67 “Total trip time” is the sum of (i) flying times of flight legs, i.e. block times; (ii) wait time between connecting 
flights; and (iii) schedule displacement, or the wait time between the desired departure time of an individual 
and the closest departing time available. 
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well bring a remarkable added value. For price-insensitive travelers, further cooperation between 
airlines that would decrease total trip time by coordinating schedules, as well as other initiatives 
that could improve the quality of service—especially in flight connections—would be positively 
welcomed. 
The other element of weight for consumers, i.e. low airfares prices, can be also delivered by GALs by 
exploiting the cost efficiencies described in Section 2.4 and by transferring these savings to their 
customers. However, as pointed before in this chapter, allied airlines may also exploit some market 
forces which could drive airfares up. A feasible option here for regulators for exerting a competitive 
pressure on GALs’ members is to facilitate the access of further competing carriers—i.e. low cost 
carriers and Gulf carriers—to intercontinental markets. Although the theory of contestable markets 
of Baumol (1982) might not be fully applicable to the EU and US liberalized airline markets, a 
current snapshot at both regions yields evidences that non-traditional unaligned carrier—like 
Southwest Airlines, Ryanair, JetBlue, easyJet or Emirates—still have a competitive edge to continue 
exerting pressure on aligned carriers in their current markets.  
Indeed, low-cost carriers have exhibited a leading role in driving airfares down. For example, the 
study of Brueckner et al. (2011) on airfares in the US, found that legacy carrier competition in an 
airport-pair market has weak effects on average fares, but the presence of low-cost carriers in the 
same or adjacent airports, or even as a potential competitor has a dramatic effect on driving 
airfares down.68 However, the implications of these findings cannot be fully transferred to 
international scenarios in which GALs compete with independent carriers; as indicated in Section 
2.3.1, it is estimated that a significant share of the cost advantages of LCCs over network legacy 
carriers in domestic markets would be lost when operating intercontinental routes. 
Still, an equitable right of access, especially at hub airports, could level the opportunities for new 
players to enter GALs’ markets and to exercise a downward pressure on intercontinental airfares. If 
one believes that the goal is to pursue efficient markets with a competitive pressure on prices, a 
possible strategy could be the modification of the so-called grandfather rights on slots at congested 
airports, and the establishment of a market-driven bargain of slots. By that, independent carriers 
could have one very relevant barrier to entry for developing international services removed. 
Nowadays, the process of slot allocation gives preference to long-standing carriers in conserving 
their rights to operate AT airports. Sometimes, this advantage to incumbent carriers provides 
network legacy carriers with a market foreclosure power, and precludes incoming carriers from 
                                                             
68 These findings endorse results from previous works of Morrison (2001) and Goolsbee & Syverson (2008). 
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operating whenever demand for air transport overcomes airport capacity. Still, other barriers 
would persist, like the economies of size and density that GALs have legitimately attained by 
developing their network strategy. 
The viability of implementing a market-driven distribution of slots at airports is open to question. 
While the changes in a market-driven slot allocation process should ideally be dynamic, the design 
and gate configuration of airport passenger buildings is associated with significant inertias, 
multiple interests, and infrastructure constraints. In fact, among the 50 largest airports in the world 
which are a hub airport for a leading airline, by 2011 nearly a 40% of them had airlines distributed 
so that each leading airline and its GAL members could connect passengers under one roof (same 
terminal and/or concourse); an additional 30% of the airports had opted for separated passenger 
buildings by domestic-international airlines or routes. Also, gate distribution and building design 
might be configured according to other factors like fitting of aircraft in gates or minimization of 
walking distances for connecting passengers, limiting the incentives for a redistribution of slots.  
Moreover, from the airport operations perspective there might be benefits associated with a static 
slot allocation mechanism. Indeed, while there are many proponents of a more dynamic 
distribution based on a market-based slot bargaining system, some of the issues raised above 
suggest that the new system could also limit the passenger output of the airport. In addition, airport 
shareholders’ goals do not need to be necessarily aligned with the creation of an equal 
opportunities playground to airlines. Local governments and corporations might promote the 
growth of airlines operating the airport as a hub in order to ensure a service with higher frequency 
and lower travel time; profit-oriented airport authorities might opt for a system that favors 
airlines capable of generating higher fees instead of a market-based mechanism, even after 
considering the trade-off between operational feasibility and profit generation. In some cases, the 
leading airline might be a shareholder of the airport and it can veto or delay the entrance of other 
carriers. An additional layer of complexity is that a nationwide coherent framework for airport’s 
slot access might be difficult to implement given the heterogeneity in airport authorities regarding 
ownership structure and management goals, especially considering the coexistence of private, 
public and hybrid public-private partnership structures of power. 
Following the thread of possible incentives for a downward pressures on airfares, in the scenario 
that independent incoming carriers could not be as price competitive as GALs, or in case that the 
reliance on market-based mechanisms for a fair slot-access policy was unfeasible, regulators might 
focus on enhancing inter-alliance competition. This approach seems to have been already adopted 
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by the US Department of Transportation (DOT). In the proceedings for granting antitrust immunity 
to the transatlantic joint venture by oneworld members American Airlines, British Airways, and 
Iberia69, the DOT stated in 2010 that this action “would provide a third global network that can 
better discipline the fares and services offered by the Star and SkyTeam alliances”.70 As a support of 
this argument, the work of Borenstein (1992) found that by adding a second or a third competitor 
in a given market reduced fares by about 8% in both cases and, interestingly, there was not much 
effect of new entrances on fares beyond the third competitor.  
The governmental branches and their dependent bodies play a crucial role in directing the future 
of global airline alliances. In this case, the importance of the airline industry in the overall society 
expands the framework of analysis out of the most basic “consumer-industry” scheme of regulation. 
In the case of the transatlantic market, in Section 4.4 we showed that the US Congress focuses, 
through the DOT, on the broad concept of public interest; similarly, in the EU, despite having set the 
consumer as the key element of their assessment on competition, we observed that other policy 
areas are actively considered in the decision-making process. As of today, we cannot find in the 
literature a policy discussion about the possible inconvenience of global airline alliances, but the 
widespread acknowledgement of (some of) the benefits for airlines mentioned in Section 2.4, with a 
focus in the importance of GALs to overcome barriers of entry to foreign airlines and the social 
benefits provided by GALs’ dense and integrated networks. Instead, the debate is centered on the 
trade-off between enhanced efficiencies from increased coordination between partner airlines on 
the one hand, and the thread of a reduced number of real competitors in O-D markets when 
coordination between airlines reduces the number of real competitors on the other.  
National political actors try to fulfill not only some of the primary goals of the other stakeholders 
considered in this section, but they might also try to shape the future of global airline alliances to 
implement their own political agendas. Here we recall some ways in which GALs can be associated 
with the development of non-transportation policies both in US and EU.  
 Economic integration: The different stages of the EU-US Air Transport Agreement are a 
bridge of coordination and understanding between the two largest economic forces in the 
world. The success of the consolidation process into a single Open Aviation Area could be 
interpreted as part of a wider process of economic and regulatory alignment.  
                                                             
69 Finnair and Royal Jordanian were also applicants, and they were also granted with antitrust immunity, 
although they did not initially integrate in the joint venture in transatlantic markets. 
70 DOT Order 2010-2-8 in Docket OST-2008-0252 at 32. 
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 Geostrategic power: the first years of the XXI century are showing a global power shift 
from the more industrialized countries to emerging nations, especially China and the rest of 
BRICs—i.e. Brazil, Russia, and India. Within this context, the condition of GALs as an initial 
North Atlantic-based construction whose major actors are still from the US and the 
European Union, and with prospects of continuing their expansion to India, China and 
Africa, gains importance. Indeed, from a foreign policy motivation, it might not seem 
unreasonable to advocate for the success of GALs over global connectors in the Middle East 
or, tentatively, Far East Asia as a way to withhold influence in a global industry of high 
strategic relevance.  
 National security: the importance of aircrafts for national security and the possibility of a 
temporary nationalization of airlines in the advent of global disruption are elements that, 
despite the low probability of occurrence and the debatable effectiveness of the measure, 
should not yet be dismissed as a factor of relevance for promoting the business models and 
economic viability of national carriers over the business models of foreign carriers. Under 
this policy goal, cross-border mergers are a tool of integration between network legacy 
carriers that should not be avoided as this would open the airline industry to foreign 
ownership. From a different perspective, a caveat of market concentration in few 
financially-integrated airline groups is that the air transportation service could be more 
vulnerable to the financial distress of one of the large airline groups, potentially disrupting 
the national economy if operations of just a single, but relevant, player ceased. 
 Job retention: the airline industry is a source of high earning jobs, and this could be an 
additional argument to protect national carriers from high-growth foreign carrier like 
Emirates by creating a regulatory framework that favors allied airlines.  
To sum up, from the political strategic perspective presented here, there might be an interest in 
allowing airlines to consolidate operations through the granting of antitrust immunity in the North 
Atlantic market. In fact, this can translate into a competitive advantage of EU and US network legacy 
carriers over unaligned foreign carriers with international services. More importantly, this strategic 
position can contribute to achieve foreign policy goals in such a manner that balances the 
preservation of national sovereignty with the circumvention of more protectionist approaches.  
Within the domestic markets in Europe and the US there are other unaligned airlines like easyJet, 
JetBlue, Ryanair, or Southwest Airlines that might not welcome the provision of antitrust immunity 
in transatlantic markets on the basis that they also favor aligned carriers in their domestic markets. 
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Actually, this exceptional regulatory treatment for transatlantic services cannot be treated 
independently from the supply of domestic services. As GAL members operate domestic routes that 
are partially feeding international routes, unaligned airlines could claim that the benefits from 
granted antitrust immunity can bring to a cross-subsidization from international operations to a 
domestic network with more frequencies and lower yields that captures more passengers on 
domestic itineraries. From this perspective, the benefits from granted antitrust immunity should 
not be merely seen as compartmentalized to transatlantic markets, but they might create 
advantages over carriers in domestic markets, distorting the fundamentals of equal treatment in 
domestic competition. 
Airlines workers and, especially, labor unions have an important bargaining power in the airline 
industry. Indeed, in the rights and benefits, well-organized workers can even shape regulation to 
their favor, as explained by Stigler (1971). So far, as joining global airline alliances is a strategy that 
seems to contribute to find a sustainable business model in the industry, and as it is not 
traditionally related to labor cuts, this strategy should be in the interest of airline workers. 
In the particular case of the most important suppliers, the two largest aircraft manufacturers 
Boeing and Airbus, they are interested in the generation of new air travel demand and, ultimately, 
the increase in demand of seat capacity. Both cheap airfares and shorter total travel times 
contribute to that end. Consequently, the position of Boeing and Airbus with respect to GALs could 
be more likely neutral in comparison with the plans of rising Gulf Carriers and the tentative 
international expansion of LCCs, which also boost traffic. Instead, other suppliers in the airline 
industry might feel more inclined to support network legacy carriers and the GAL’s strategy instead 
of other business models, as the former are oriented to serve business-passengers, and this leaves 
more space for adding value in the supply chain.  
Overall, there is a widespread consensus that alliances can have a very positive impact on the public 
interest when partners do not coordinate to increase prices or reduce output, as this still leaves 
alliance partners as competitors. Some skepticism, however, has arisen over the need of antitrust 
immunity for airlines to provide better services to customers in terms of schedules and prices, even 
on connecting routes. Further integration within the GALs seems positive for the airlines involved 
in the cooperative agreements and, ultimately, these positive effects might be transferred to 
costumers. However, there are concerns about the reduction in the number of real competitors and 
the evolution towards a oligopolistic industry if potential incoming airlines find significant barriers 
to entry to airports and international airspace jurisdictions.  
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Amid uncertainty, an adaptive strategy is the provision of time-limited antitrust immunity. The ex 
post facto empirical analysis by scholars and policy analysts would provide enough evidence to 
evaluate the convenience of renovating this form of merger-like integration in the transatlantic O-D 
markets. In that assessment, the many vested interests of the involved stakeholders and the 
importance of the airline industry as an enhancer of business, tourism, socio-economic 
development, and national and foreign policy should not be disregarded by policy-makers. Finally, 
the implications of these experiences in both the EU and the US could be made extensive to the 
entire global airline industry, being a referent for future international bilateral and multilateral 
agreements between countries—in a similar way as the Deregulation Act in the US in 1978 has 
been a model for the worldwide liberalization of domestic markets. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
The goal of this thesis has been to provide an explanatory framework that could identify the 
reasons of the continuous growth of the three global airline alliances (GALs) a decade after they 
were launched. The intention has been to provide a holistic view on GALs from transport 
economics, public policy and corporate strategy perspectives. As part of this work, in Chapter 3 we 
have analyzed the relation between the growth of GALs from 2006 to 2011 and the evolution in the 
code share agreements’ strategy of enrolled carriers during that period. The other chapters of the 
thesis have provided a framework for comprehending the past, present, and future of global airline 
alliances. Following, in Section 5.1 we summarize the most relevant contributions of this thesis, and 
in Section 5.2 we propose a few lines of research that could build on the work developed here. 
 
5.1 Research contributions 
 
 
Based on the findings in previous chapters, the following conclusions can be drawn from this thesis 
on the impact of alliances on members’ network development: 
 In most of the largest economies in the world the air transportation sector has substantially 
higher barriers to foreign investment than all other industries, including extensively 
regulated service sectors. This makes the provision of international air services an 
exceptional case in an increasingly globalized world. Indeed, the combination of augmenting 
international human mobility and the existence of barriers to entry in foreign bases 
supports the logic behind the development of collaborative agreements between airlines 
such as global airline alliances. 
 Membership in a global airline alliance for developing an international network has been 
adopted by 18 of the 20 largest airlines in the world. All these members together gather half 
of the world capacity and two-thirds of the international traffic. However, global alliances 
are not the only strategy for network growth; in fact, they have been limited to the so-called 
network legacy carriers. Among the top-150 airlines only 30% are aligned with a global 
airline alliance. Low cost carriers and a group of rising carriers in the Persian Gulf have 
more recently opted for the provision of international air services with different strategies, 
which are also depicted in this thesis. 
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 The benefits of alliances for enrolled members are largerly based on the economies of 
density and scope associated with code share agreements and, tentatively, on the 
collaboration in pricing and scheduling in antitrust immunized partnerships. Further gains 
like efficiency improvements from learning, cost savings from joint purchasing, an adequate 
reallocation of resources, or marketing benefits from the association with the “global airline 
alliance brand” depend on a closer collaboration between members. These potential 
benefits are amid a trade-off between the gains from consolidation and the dilution of some 
competitive advantages of firms, like the marketing strength of the “national brand” among 
consumers.  
 Global airline alliances are the preferred scheme for airlines in the development of an 
international code sharing network. In an analysis of the code share agreements in force in 
the period 2006-2011, we observe that as more airlines joined each GAL, their members 
increased the proportion of code share agreements with partners of the same GAL. We also 
observe that code share agreements between GAL partners were much less prone to be 
broken than agreements with non-partner airlines. In fact, 75% of the broken partnerships 
were due to exceptional reasons: either one of the airlines disappeared or it exited the 
initial GAL. Overall, every year there are more long-term code share agreements between 
members of the same GAL, and a decreasing need to develop code share agreements with 
non-partner airlines.  
 The size of the global alliance plays a relevant role. Members of Star Alliance, the largest 
GAL, have, all else equal, significantly more code share routes and code share agreements 
than carriers aligned with SkyTeam and oneworld. Members of the smallest alliance, 
oneworld, need to develop a higher percentage of their code share agreements outside the 
global alliance but, also, during 2006-2011 they made more use of all the possible 
partnerships available within the GAL than members of Star Alliance and SkyTeam. Still, 
airline size is the most determining factor of the number of code sharing routes of a given 
airline, predicting 50% of its code shares. 
 The transatlantic (Europe-North America) market is the more relevant flow for global 
airline alliances at present and in the mid-term future. It is the origin of global airline 
alliances were initiated, the largest intercontinental flow in the world, and where the three 
GALs together hold their largest market share. Also, all else equal, airlines operating in the 
transatlantic market have significantly more code sharing routes than aligned carriers 
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based in other regions. Within the regulatory framework, the first phases of the EU-US Air 
Transport Agreement initiated in 2008 are the most advanced bilateral agreements in the 
industry and they could consolidate the European Union and the United States into a single, 
liberalized market, the so-called Open Aviation Area. In the meanwhile, each GAL has a 
group of two to five airlines granted with antitrust immunity by the US to coordinate 
operations in the transatlantic markets. 
 The literature has generally reported lower fares in complementary alliances, while the 
research on parallel alliances (from hub to hub) is yet inconclusive. Overall, there can be 
upward pressures on fares from the price-setting ability of airlines under antitrust 
immunity and the reduction in the number of real competitors, as well as downward 
pressures from efficiency gains from cooperation in carriers’ operations. The final impact 
on airfares in a given market depends on the balance between upward and downward 
forces, which is conditioned by the competitive pressure from other airlines. 
 Global airline alliances will still play a leading role in the future. In the advent of a common 
EU-US regulatory framework that allowed cabotage operations and cross-border mergers, 
we do not identify relevant revenue growth opportunities in the transatlantic market 
resulting from further consolidation. The stronger growth in other international and 
intercontinental flows and the persistence of regulatory barriers to foreign investors augur 
the reinforcement of global airline alliances as a strategy for the development of 
international networks of legacy carriers. 
 The positive impact of global airline alliances is widely acknowledged. There is less 
agreement about the effects of granting allied carriers with antitrust immunity. From a 
consumer’s perspective, airlines’ consolidation entails a trade-off between the efficiency 
gains for airlines that could be translated into a cheaper and more coordinated service, and 
the reduction of competitors to just three independent servers and the potential 
monopolistic or oligopolistic practices that this could entail. A market-based system for slot 
distribution among airlines at congested airports that reduced barriers to entry for 
potential unaligned competitors could facilitate more competitive pressure on aligned 
airlines, especially at capacity constrained airports. 
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5.2 Future research directions 
 
Although this thesis has provided a basis for understanding the use of GALs by airlines for 
developing code share agreements and, hence, expanding their network of destinations, we have 
not studied the effects of GALs on the annual revenue or net income of enrolled carriers. Further 
research should evaluate this impact in order to assess the economic value-added of strategic 
alliances in the airline industry. Oum et al. (2000) have estimated productivity and profitability for 
aligned airlines, although they only considered each code share agreement as a binomial variable 
that noted the major or minor extent of the agreement. The availability of data for the number of 
code sharing routes in each agreement—as shown in Chapter  3—and the ability to weight each 
route, according to estimations of demand or partner size, could help to introduce a more accurate 
characterization of each agreement to address this line of research. 
Chapter 2 explored the potential benefits of alliances for airlines. The next step is to examine the 
operational challenges for airlines enrolled in global alliances. The adaptation of revenue 
management systems to collaborative agreements within global alliances is a field that researchers 
are actively studying, as pointed out by Jain (2011). The same author calls attention to different 
schemes of revenue sharing between alliance partners that could be analyzed for their possible 
future implementation. Another area to be studied is the co-adaptation of airports and global airline 
alliance operations. In fact, this latter relation is a key element for comprehending the functioning 
of global airline alliances in their provision of seamless connections to passengers. Furthermore, a 
deeper understanding of the role of airports in global airline alliances could provide relevant 
knowledge about the convenience of different systems of slot allocation that could contribute to a 
more competitive industry. 
This thesis has presented some implications arising from the relation between the size of a GAL and 
the code share strategy of its members. However, we have not proved the existence of a causal 
relationship between GAL size and volume of code share agreements or network size. The general 
perception is that members benefit from a global alliance covering more international destinations, 
as this can provide a more complete and robust service to each airline’s consumer base. At the same 
time, as the number of members increases, network overlapping is more likely to occur and some 
airlines might be exposed to limitations to growth. On the whole, finding the optimal size of each 
global airline alliance is a question of great interest that could, for example, be studied with a game 
theory approach in which the interests of the different actors involved in the alliance were 
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considered. Some relevant findings could arise with an impact on other multilateral strategic 
organizations as well. 
Finally, any future significant deviation from the international regulatory framework presented in 
both Section 2.2 and Section 4.4 could have an important impact on the evolution of global airline 
alliances. In the same way that this work builds on the initial study of Fernandez de la Torre (1999) 
on airline alliances, which was written in a period in which multilateral strategic alliances were just 
beginning, prospective studies could explore the changes of alliances in a future environment. In all 
respects this thesis tries to provide a suitable framework for future research analyses of global 
airline alliances as a strategy for international network development. 
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